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Summary
In modern society we are surrounded by distributed systems. Most
electronic devices that are currently on the market have some networking
capability or are able to communicate with each other. Communication
over shared media is inherently insecure. Therefore, proper design of secu-
rity protocols is of primary concern. The design and analysis of security
protocols is a challenging task. Several protocols have been proposed in the
literature which later were found to be flawed. This is a consequence of the
intrinsic complexity associated with the presence of a malicious adversary.
The traditional complexity-theoretical adversarial model is realistic but
complex. As a consequence of this, designing and analyzing protocols in
this model is error prone. The Dolev-Yao model refers to the attacker
model in which an adversary has complete control over the communication
media. In this model, the adversary is not bounded in running time but
is completely unable to break any cryptographic primitive. This model is
satisfactory as it provides a good level of abstraction. Proofs are simpler
than the complexity-theoretical ones, and therefore less error prone, still
capturing most common mistakes in the design of security protocols.
This thesis addresses the problem of secure protocol design from both
formal and computational perspectives and also studies the relation among
them. We present four original contributions:
• We present a decentralized digital currency for peer-to-peer and grid
applications that is able to detect double-spending of the coins and
other types of fraud.
• We develop a formal framework for the analysis of anonymizing proto-
cols in terms of epistemic logic. We illustrate our approach by proving
sender anonymity and unlinkability of some well-known anonymizing
protocols.
• We relate the Dolev-Yao model, extended with hash functions, with
a realistic computational model. We use a special randomized con-
struction to interpret hashes. We show that this model is sound and
complete in presence of passive adversaries. We also show that this
model is not sound in presence of active adversaries.
• We further explore the relation between these two models consider-
ing commitment schemes and active adversaries. We propose a new
stronger security notion for commitment schemes and give a novel
construction that is provably secure under this definition. We illus-
trate the usefulness of this new machinery by giving a sound inter-
pretation of symbolic commitments in the standard model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Originally, computers where isolated (rather big) pieces of machinery de-
signed to accomplish some task. With the widespread use of computing
systems there was an increasing need for intercommunication. Computer
networks emerged and with them the need to establish conventions for com-
munication, since these computers potentially have different architectures
and operating systems. A protocol (coming from the Greek protocollon,
which was a leaf of paper glued to a manuscript volume, describing its con-
tents) involves two or more parties, and describes a sequence of steps that
each party must perform. This sequence of steps must be precisely defined
and should be executed in order. We deal with protocols in everyday life. A
simple example of a communication protocol is the one of the walky-talky.
A walky-talky is a bi-directional radio transceiver where only one radio
transmits at a time. In this protocol each party must push a button while
talking and finish the message with the keyword ‘over’. This indicates to the
other party that it is the end of the message and that the communication
channel becomes available for transmission again. Obviously, if one party
deviates from the protocol and omits the ‘over’ keyword, then the other
parties would wait indefinitely. The Internet Protocol (IP) is probably the
most widely used network protocol at present. Other protocols like POP3
and HTTP are also used in the ‘everyday life’ and greatly contributed to
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the expansion and success of the Internet.
As networks expand, say outside a company or institution, the network
and parties become untrusted. Then, we need special protocols that can
achieve some properties like authentication and secrecy (defined later in
Section 1.2) even when some malicious entity is in control of the network
and/or some of the parties.
A security or cryptographic protocol is a protocol that has a security goal.
Security goals are properties that try to withstand malicious attempts to
abuse the system. In a protocol, each party is called principal or agent and
might be a human, computer, smart card, etc. It is customary to name these
principals Alice, Bob, Charlie and so on. Principals do not necessarily trust
each other and the communication media is also, in general, not trusted. It
is assumed to be reliable in the sense that transmission errors are absent.
Principals execute the protocol by exchanging a sequence of messages. The
protocol is secure if the security goal is fulfilled upon termination. An
attacker is a principal that does not necessarily follows the protocol. In
fact, her main objective is to break the security goal. The attacker is often
called Trudy or Eve. Security protocols are the subject of study of this
thesis.
Now one might wonder how it is possible to achieve any security in such
an adverse scenario. This is where cryptography comes into play.
1.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Cryptographic primitives are the basic building blocks for security
Spartan Skytale
protocols. Cryptography is the art (or science) of
secret writing and was first and briefly used by the
Egyptians, 4000 years ago. A simple substitution ci-
pher, so-called Atbash cipher, was used by the He-
brews (around 600 BC). This cipher consisted of a
reversed ordered alphabet. In order to encrypt a mes-
sage, every occurrence of the letter A was replaced by
Z, B by Y and so on. The Spartans (around 400 BC)
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used a belt, rolled on a random-diameter cylinder, called Skytale to write
their secret messages. The diameter of the cylinder was a shared secret be-
tween the originator and receiver of the message. Having just the belt with
some letters written on it, it is hard to recover the original message. Julius
Caesar (100 BC) also used a substitution cipher consisting of shifting each
letter of the alphabet by a fixed (secret) amount. All these are examples of
symmetric key cryptosystems.
Plaintext: A T T A C K G A U L
Ciphertext: D W W D F N J D X O
Figure 1.1: Caesar’s cipher with a shift of three letters
Their purpose is to facilitate secure and private communication among
principals, over an insecure channel. It is assumed that these principals
share a secret, called the (secret) key. The message, called plaintext, must
remain secret to anyone that is not in possession of the secret key. To
achieve this, the plaintext is encoded and scrambled with the key in such a
way that an observer cannot extract any useful information from it. This
encoded message is called ciphertext. On the other hand, a principal that
is in possession of the secret key should still be able to recover the original
message.
Modern encryption schemes achieve much stronger security properties
than their historical counterparts. Probably the simplest encryption scheme
known is also the best: the one-time pad, invented by Mauborgne and
Vernam [Kah67] in 1917. The key consists of a sequence of random bits
of the same length as the plaintext. In order to encrypt a message, just
compute an exclusive or operation (XOR) with the key. In order to decrypt
just XOR the ciphertext with the symmetric key, recovering the original
plaintext. This simple encryption scheme is perfect in the sense that it
perfectly hides any information about the plaintext. There are few practical
inconveniences for its use such as the fact that sender and receiver must
share a key of the same length as the message, and that this key cannot be
reused.
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The Data Encryption Standard (DES), has been a worldwide standard
for decades. It is a block cypher where the message and the key are scram-
bled together by a sequence of permutations, substitutions and XOR oper-
ations. The design principles of DES have not been revealed but it resisted
years of cryptanalysis. However, due to short key length, it was vulnerable
by a hardware implementation of a brute force attack. This attack simply
consists of trying exhaustively every possible key. Its successor, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) has nicer mathematical properties and signifi-
cantly longer key sizes. So far there are no known attacks to the full version
of it and is considered the state of the art in symmetric key cyphers.
A revolutionary new concept, public key cryptography was introduced
by Diffie and Hellman in [DH76]. Concurrently and independently, this
notion was also proposed by Ralph Merkle in [Mer78] but, due to a slow
publishing process, his contribution was made public almost two years later.
The revolutionary idea behind public key cryptography is that encryption
and decryption keys could be different. Therefore, depending on the appli-
cation, one of them could be made public. This lead to a number of new
applications like digital signatures [RSA78b] and key agreement [DH76],
among others. In contrast with symmetric key cryptography, with public
key cryptography it is suddenly possible, for two principals that do not
share any secret, to establish a private channel. The first practical im-
plementation of a public key encryption scheme, was published by Rivest,
Shamir and Adleman [RSA78a].
Digital signatures are the digital counterpart of traditional signatures.
The signer has a secret signing key and the corresponding verification key
is made public. The binding between the public key of the signer and
his identity must be certified by the so called certification authority. A
certification authority is a trusted party, that after authenticating a person
and having some evidence of the possession of the private key, issues a
public key certificate. This public key certificate is a statement where the
certification authority certifies that the claimed public key actually belongs
to his identity. This certificate is signed by the certification authority itself.
In order to verify that a public key certificate is valid, principals need
to have access to the public key of the certification authority. This is
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considered to be well known, and in practice it is incorporated into web-
browsers and other network clients.
Cryptographic hash functions (hereafter, simply hash functions), play a
fundamental role in modern cryptography. They are basic building blocks
for signature schemes [Dam88], encryption schemes [CS03b], message au-
thentication codes [Tsu92] and they are also widely used as fingerprint for
any kind of digital data. A hash function h maps bitstrings of arbitrary
finite length to bitstrings of fixed length. It should be efficient to com-
pute and hard to invert. This means that given a bitstring x it is easy to
compute the hash value h(x), but given h(x) it is infeasible to compute
x. Moreover, it is infeasible to find any bitstring y such that h(y) = h(x).
Hash functions are many-to-one, therefore there must be different values x
and y for which h(x) = h(y). Such values are called collisions. Another
security requirement for hash functions, collision resistance (aka. strongly
collision resistance) is that it is infeasible to find any collision.
Commitment schemes are also one of the fundamental cryptographic
primitives and are used in protocols like zero-knowledge proofs [GMW91],
secure multiparty computation [GMW87], contract signing [EGL85], and
can be directly used for bidding protocols. A commitment consists of two
phases: the commitment phase where the principals commit to a message
without revealing any information about it; and the opening phase where
the principals reveal the message and it is possible to verify that this mes-
sage corresponds to the committed value in the commitment phase. After
the commitment phase it should be infeasible to open the commitment to
a different value than the one committed. This property is called binding.
Semantic security is an intuitive and by now standard security notion. It
was proposed by Goldwasser and Micali in their seminal paper Probabilistic
Encryption [GM84a], where they also establish the foundations of modern
cryptography. Intuitively, semantic security means that it is infeasible for
the adversary to ‘learn anything’ about the plaintext by looking at the
ciphertext. This is important in practice as when keys are being encrypted,
leaking a single bit reduces de key search time by a factor of two. This is an
appropriate security notion while considering eavesdropping adversaries.
While considering an adversary that is able to intercept and modify
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messages, semantic security is not strong enough. In particular it does not
guarantee that the adversary is not able to modify a ciphertext into another
ciphertext that decrypts to a related plaintext, even without knowing the
original plaintext. This notion is known as malleability and was intro-
duced by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN91]. The notion of malleability also
extends to other cryptographic primitives like signature and commitment
schemes. Malleability is a real problem in practice; imagine a situation
where we are bidding for a certain good, and we are using a malleable
commitment scheme to do so. It is clear that if the adversary could mod-
ify our bid, let us say, by adding one to it, then we would not be able to
win the auction. Non-malleability is hard to achieve and it is usually over-
looked by practitioners while designing security protocols. Traditionally it
was assumed that non-malleability somehow followed from the fact that
the set of valid plaintexts was sparse in the set of all possible bitstrings.
In fact, the first practical non-malleable encryption scheme under ‘realistic
assumptions’ was due to Cramer and Shoup [CS03a] in 1998, almost ten
years after non-malleability was proposed. For the case of hashes, there
are still no known constructions for non-malleable hashes that have been
proven secure. Even worse, an equivalent notion to non-malleability for
hashes has not been formulated. Particularly for hashes, this constitutes a
gap between the formal analysis of security protocols and the underlying
cryptographic assumptions, as in the former, non-malleability for hashes is
implicitly assumed.
So far, we have intentionally been using the word infeasible without a
precise meaning. This is because its meaning depends on the adversarial
model. This notion will be defined later in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.1.
It is hard to describe in a realistic manner what the capabilities of the
attacker are. As a matter of fact, the adversarial model seems to be evolving
over the years: as new attacks are found, the adversarial model be comes
stronger.
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1.2 Security Goals
Next, we briefly describe some of the most common security goals. This
list is, of course, incomplete and vague as security goals in practice vary as
much as the problems that people intend to solve.
1. Confidentiality has always had a central role in cryptography and it
has a clear meaning: some sensitive message remains unknown to
everyone except its intended recipients.
2. Authenticity is when the recipient of a message is certain of its origi-
nator. When initiating a communication it also means that initiator
and responder know the identity of each other (mutual authentica-
tion). This property is harder to verify than secrecy and there is a
long history of flawed protocols that intended to achieve it.
3. (Data) integrity is when the receiver of a message is able to check
whether the message has been modified during transmission or not.
4. Availability means that a certain data (or service) is reachable (or
working properly) when needed.
5. Non-repudiation means that the sender of a message is not able to
deny, later, that he sent this message because there is a non-refutable
proof that he did it.
6. Anonymity is the property of remaining unknown. Such a property is
highly desired in some contexts like internet voting. An anonymizing
protocol is a protocol that has the goal of hiding the identities of the
users.
7. Unlinkability is another information hiding property and it is slightly
more subtle than anonymity. Intuitively, it means that the adversary
does not know if two principals are communicating with each other
at all.
8. Plausible deniability is the capability of a principal of proving that he
does not possess a certain knowledge.
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1.3 Design and Analysis of Security Protocols
In order to design and analyze a security protocol we first need to define in
which environment this protocol is supposed to run. To do that we need
to define the capabilities and limitations of the principals (including the
adversary) and the communication media. Then we need to define what
kind of properties this protocol is supposed to fulfill.
1.3.1 The System and Adversarial Models
The system model includes honest participants that behave exactly as spec-
ified in the protocol. We assume that each of these participants has a secure
environment in which to compute, such as a personal computer or smart
card. These participants perform actions like communication and compu-
tations. Depending on the network model the communication might be
asynchronous, private, anonymous, authenticated, etc. In order to be able
to determine the security of a protocol we need to define what are the
capabilities of the adversary. Next we describe some common adversarial
models.
The Dolev-Yao Model
The Dolev-Yao (aka. symbolic or algebraic) model refers to the attacker
model proposed by Dolev and Yao in [DY83], following the directions of
Needham and Schroeder [NS78]. In this model, the adversary has complete
control over the communication media. Principals deliver every message to
the adversary and she might forward, destroy, delay or modify each mes-
sage at will. Moreover, she is capable of synthesizing new messages and
deliver these new messages to honest participants. There are well defined
rules constraining what kind of messages the adversary is allowed to build.
Intuitively, these are the messages that she can build by combining the in-
formation she learns from previously seen messages, her private information
and some fresh randomness. In this model, the adversary is not bounded
in running time but is completely unable to break any cryptographic prim-
itive. For instance, this means that if the adversary sees a ciphertext for
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which she does not know the decryption key, then she learns nothing about
the original plaintext. Similarly for hashes, a hash value h(x) does not
reveal any information about the pre-image x. This extends to any other
security properties of the cryptographic primitives, like non-malleability
and collision resistant. This constitutes a fairly strong assumption.
The main advantage of this model is that it provides a good level of
abstraction. Proofs are much simpler and therefore less error prone than the
computational ones, still capturing most common mistakes while designing
security protocols. This follows the principle that “Cryptography is not
broken, it is circumvented” as Shamir said. A key advantage of this model
is that there are tools like ProVerif [Bla01] and Scyther [Cre06] that are
capable of automatically proving some security goals such as authentication
and secrecy.
Traditional Computationally-Bound Adversary
In this model, principals are probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines
and so is the adversary. The security parameter is a natural number in
unary representation. These Turing machines take as an argument the se-
curity parameter and are allowed to run in polynomial time on the size
of their input. The intuition is that breaking a cryptographic primitive
requires super-polynomial time. Therefore, by increasing the security pa-
rameter, the protocol becomes arbitrarily hard to break. In this context,
algorithms define probability distributions over bitstrings and security is
usually defined in terms of computational indistinguishability of these dis-
tributions. What is feasible for an adversary in this model is simple: any
polynomial-time computation.
The main advantage of this model is also its main disadvantage: it con-
siders every possible behavior for an attacker. As a consequence proofs are
very complicated and error prone. But how is it at all possible to show
that there is no efficient algorithm that can break the security goal? Here
is where the computational assumptions come in to play. There is a (small)
number of problems that are considered to be of super-polynomial complex-
ity (e.g., factoring RSA integers or taking logarithms in cryptographically
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strong groups), mainly because the scientific community has spent ‘enough’
effort trying to find efficient solutions to these problems and failed. After
some time these assumptions became widely accepted. Then, the proof
strategy for a security protocol consists in reducing the security of the pro-
tocol to one of these computationally hard problems. The argument runs
as follows: if the protocol is broken then we solve a hard problem, but this
is (conjectured to be) not possible, ergo the protocol is secure.
1.3.2 Challenges in Design and Analysis
The design and analysis of security protocols is a challenging task. Several
protocols have been proposed in the literature e.g., [NS78, DS81] which
many years later were found to be flawed [Low95, Low96, Low97]. This is
not due to negligent design but it is a consequence of the intrinsic com-
plexity associated with the presence of a malicious adversary. This makes
it difficult to use standard debugging techniques such as model checking.
Beyond standard security notions like authentication and secrecy there are
no well established techniques for the analysis and design of security proto-
cols, for example, for digital currencies or anonymity. Another problem is
the lack of modularity: in general, security protocols are not compositional.
This means that having two protocols that are secure does not imply that
these protocols together are secure. Canetti, in his universal composabil-
ity framework [Can01], took the first steps addressing this problem. In
general, non-malleable cryptographic primitives are of great aid towards
modular design of security protocols.
1.3.3 Relating these two Adversarial Models
Abadi and Rogaway in [AR02] pioneered on the idea of relating these two
adversarial models and showed that, under appropriated assumptions on
the underlying cryptographic primitives, a simple language of encrypted
expressions is sound with respect to the computational model, while con-
sidering passive adversaries. Much more work has been done in this direc-
tion [MW04b, MP05, Her05, GvR06b] considering different cryptographic
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primitives and adversarial models.
The relation between these two models consists of a map form sym-
bolic messages m, to distributions over bitstrings [[m]]. This map should
relate messages that are observationally equivalent in the symbolic world
to indistinguishable distributions over bitstrings. Such a map allows one
to use formal methods, possibly even automated, to reason about security
properties of protocols and have these reasonings to be valid also in the
computational world.
This technique is useful as it combines the advantages of each model.
On the one hand proofs are simple, less error prone and can be verified by
formal analysis techniques. On the other hand, these proofs have associ-
ated a proof in the computational setting considering all possible proba-
bilistic polynomial time adversaries and standard assumptions on the cryp-
tographic primitives.
So far there is no work in the literature that we are aware of that
relates this models for hash functions and commitment schemes, which
would greatly aid in formal analysis techniques.
1.4 Overview of this Thesis
The contribution of this thesis is on protocol design and analysis address-
ing the challenges described in Section 1.3.2 supported by computational
soundness techniques addressing the issues exposed in Section 1.3.3. In this
thesis we propose four original contributions which we summarize below.
Unless otherwise mentioned, each chapter is based on previously published
work. Below we also credit the co-authors.
Chapter 2. Protocol Design using Hashes for E-currency
This chapter describes a non-traditional application of hash functions as
a building block for a digital purse for decentralized Peer-to-peer systems.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) and grid systems allow their users to exchange infor-
mation and share resources, with little centralized or hierarchical control,
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instead relying on the fairness of the users to make roughly as much re-
sources available as they use. To enforce this balance, some kind of currency
or barter (called karma) is needed that must be exchanged for resources
thus limiting abuse. Previous proposals for such systems have not taken
the decentralized and non-hierarchical nature of P2P and grid systems into
account. The system is based on tracing the spending pattern of coins, and
distributing the normally central role of a bank over a predetermined, but
random, selection of nodes.
This chapter is based on the article “Off-line Karma: A Decentralized
Currency for Peer-to-peer and Grid Applications” [GH05a] by Jaap-Henk
Hoepman and the author, which subsumes the article “Off-line Karma: A
Decentralized Currency for Static Peer-to-peer and Grid Networks” [GH05b]
by the same authors.
Chapter 3. Protocol Analysis of Anonymity in the Formal Setting
This chapter provides a formal framework for the analysis of information
hiding properties of anonymous communication protocols in terms of epis-
temic logic. The key ingredient is the notion of observational equivalence,
which is based on the cryptographic structure of messages and relations
between otherwise random looking messages. Two runs are considered ob-
servationally equivalent if a spy cannot discover any meaningful distinction
between them. We illustrate our approach by proving sender anonymity and
unlinkability for two anonymizing protocols, Onion Routing and Crowds.
Moreover, we consider a version of Onion Routing in which we inject a
subtle error and show how our framework is capable of capturing this flaw.
This chapter is based on the article “Provable Anonymity” [GHPvR05]
by Ichiro Hasuo, Wolter Pieters, Peter van Rossum and the author.
Chapter 4. From Formal to Computational Proofs of Protocols
using Hashes
This chapter provides one more step towards bridging the gap between the
formal and computational approaches to the verification of cryptographic
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protocols. We extend the well-known Abadi-Rogaway logic with probabilis-
tic hashes and give a precise semantic interpretation of it using Canetti’s
oracle hashes. These are probabilistic polynomial-time hashes that hide
all partial information. We show that, under appropriate conditions on
the encryption scheme, this interpretation is computationally sound and
complete. This can be used to port security results from the formal world
to the computational world when considering passive adversaries. We also
give an explicit example showing that oracle hashing is not strong enough
to obtain such a result for active adversaries.
This chapter is based on the articles “Sound Computational Interpre-
tation of Symbolic Hashes in the Standard Model” [GvR06b] by Peter
van Rossum and the author and the unpublished “Completeness of For-
mal Hashes in the Standard Model” [GvR06a] available as preprint, by the
same authors. A journal version, consisting of a compound of this two
articles, appears as [GvR08].
Chapter 5. Extending Computational Soundness Further: the
case of Non-malleable Commitments
This chapter aims to find a proper security notion for commitment schemes
to give a sound computational interpretation of symbolic commitments. We
introduce an indistinguishability based security definition of commitment
schemes that is equivalent to non-malleability with respect to commitment.
Then, we give a construction using tag-based encryption and one-time sig-
natures that is provably secure assuming the existence of trapdoor permu-
tations. Finally, we apply this new machinery to give a sound interpretation
of symbolic commitments in the Dolev-Yao model while considering active
adversaries.
This chapter is based on the article “Computational Soundness of Non-
Malleable Commitments” [GGvR08] by David Galindo, Peter van Rossum
and the author.

Chapter 2
Protocol Design using
Hashes for E-currency
2.1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer (aka. P2P) networks like the widely used BitTorrent [Coh03]
and Freenet [CSWH01], and grid systems [BHF03] are distributed systems
without centralized control or hierarchical organization. Given this flat
structure, these systems scale very well when the number of nodes increases.
Scalability is important, given the fact that the Internet is still growing
exponentially and more and more people have permanent Internet access
with flat rates. Current applications of these systems include but are not
limited to: file sharing, redundant storage, distributed computations, data
perpetuation, P2P e-mail, P2P web cache and anonymizing systems.
Grid systems capitalize on the observation that computer resources are
usually very badly distributed in both time and space, and often wasted.
CPU cycles are maybe the best example of this. Most of the computers in
the world are idle most of the time, with only occasional periods of high
load. Then, it seems natural to make resources available when idle, and
to be able to use the resources of other users in return, when needed. In
an ideal grid system, the whole Internet constitutes a huge supercomputer
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with practically unlimited resources, that members can use as long as they
contribute to it as well. Projects like seti@home, folding@home and dis-
tributed.net have shown that a large set of common desktop computers
can provide a tremendous amount of computing power. Even though they
receive no direct benefit, users participate in such projects because they
associate themselves with the goals of the project. If such large scale com-
putations are for an uncompelling cause, it is not easy to find people willing
to donate their CPU time.
Also, many P2P networks suffer from the ‘free-riders’ problem where
users only occasionally connect to the network to use the resources of-
fered by it, but do not donate any resources themselves. Adar and Huber-
man [AH00] performed a traffic study on the Gnutella network revealing
that 70% of the users share no files at all. To counter such problems, ‘cur-
rencies’ of some sort have been proposed to reward users contributing to
the system and that can be used as payment when the resources of the
network are used.
2.1.1 Related Work
Several P2P systems like POPCORN [NLRC98] and MojoNation1 use some
kind of digital currency to enforce contribution and optimize resource dis-
tribution. All these systems use a central bank or broker to track each
user’s balance and transactions. Micropayment schemes [GMA+95, RS97,
Riv04, Pa´r05] like Rivest and Shamir’s PayWorld and MicroMint [RS97],
Glassman et al’s Millicent [GMA+95] and Rivest’s Pepercoin [Riv04] seem
to be especially suitable for such a task. However, these schemes are cen-
tralized and the load of the central broker grows linearly with the number
of transactions. It is clear that when scalability is of primary concern, a
central bank or broker constitutes both a bottleneck as well as a single point
of failure. In the context of P2P networks, avoiding lawsuits is an extra
motivation for having a decentralized system, i.e., there is no single entity
that can be sued but just a large number of regular users of the system.
1MojoNation no longer exists, but the website has been archived. See web.archive.
org/web/*/mojonation.net/*.
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The aforementioned approaches are therefore not suitable to fully solve our
problem. Furthermore, there is no trivial way to decentralize them given
that the trusted bank plays an important role in such a scheme.
At the moment, the only distributed currency we are aware of that is
fully decentralized is KARMA [VCS03]. In that system, the bank for a user
is distributed over a bank set of r users, that all need to be on-line, and
that are all involved in every transaction between their “owners”. KARMA
splits the bank functionality in different bank sets, which are sets of users of
size r. Each of these bank sets is responsible for keeping the state balance
of a set of users. In KARMA, every transaction between users Alice and
Bob involves communication between them, between Alice and Bob and
their bank sets, and most importantly, it involves r to r communications
between the bank set of Alice and the bank set of Bob. This incurs a large
overhead, especially in cases where the transaction rate is high.
Another interesting approach is PPay [YGM03]. PPay is a lightweight
micropayment scheme for P2P systems. In PPay the issuer of the coin is
responsible for keeping track of it. With every transaction the issuer of the
coin updates a pointer to the new owner, in a secure manner. The main
drawback with PPay is that it uses a central server (called broker) when
the issuer of a coin is off-line. This means that when Alice, who owns a
coin minted by Carol who is off-line, wants to spend it at Bob, Alice should
make the transaction via a central broker. In some frameworks, were the
ratio of off-line users is high or in very dynamic systems were users join at
some point and never reconnect again, the probability of finding the original
issuer of the coin on-line is very low. Therefore, in certain situations PPay
converges to a system with a centralized accounting bank.
2.1.2 Our Contribution
We present a completely decentralized, off-line karma implementation for
dynamic P2P and grid systems, that detects double-spending and other
types of fraud under various adversarial scenarios. The system is based on
the tracing of the spending pattern of coins, and distributing the normally
central role of a bank over a predetermined, but random, selection of nodes.
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Transactions between users do not require the cooperation of this distribu-
ted bank — this is more efficient, but as a result double spending cannot
be prevented. Instead, karma coins need to be occasionally reminted to
detect fraud. The system is designed to allow nodes to join and leave the
system at arbitrary times. In our system, a transaction only involves com-
munication between the two users exchanging the coin. As a trade off, we
can only provide double-spending detection instead of prevention. For an
alternative approach we refer the reader to [Hoe07].
We focus on the payment for CPU cycles as an application of our tech-
niques, and show how a special minting technique allows us to initialize
the system and provide its users with coins in a quite autonomous fashion.
Coins correspond to CPU cycles, and the bag of coins owned by a user cor-
responds, in a sense, to a battery charged with CPU cycles. The battery is
initially empty, and can be charged by minting coins. Minting takes quite
a few CPU cycles. Alternatively, a coin can be obtained by performing
roughly the same amount of work, but for another user. Extensions of our
protocols to trade coins for other resources are certainly possible, and only
involves initializing the system with a set of coins in a different manner.
In order to provide some abstraction, we build our system on top of an
arbitrary overlay network which provides certain services as described in
Section 2.2. The reader can think in a layered structure where TCP/IP is
at the bottom, above it there is a P2P routing layer, followed by a secure
routing layer, and the off-line karma protocol on top. We stress that the off-
line karma protocol we present here could be implemented on an arbitrary
P2P network that supports secure routing, or on which a secure routing
layer can be implemented.
2.1.3 Structure of the Chapter
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
the system model and notation used throughout the chapter. We describe
the system objectives and the capabilities of the adversary in Section 2.3.
Then we present our karma implementation in Section 2.4, first for a static
network and then the dynamic case. Finally, Section 2.5 discusses methods
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for early double-spending detection, and Section 2.6 presents our conclu-
sions and directions for further research.
2.2 System Model
In the context of this work we want to stay abstracted from the underlying
overlay network. We are going to model common characteristics that apply
to routing overlays like CAN [RFH+01], Chord [SMLN+03], Pastry [RD01]
and Tapestry [ZHR+04] as in [CDG+02], where the reader can find also a
nice and brief description of each system. In this abstract model, every node
that joins the system is assigned a uniform random identifier u from the
identifier space Π. We assume that the overlay network provides primitives
for both user look-up and message routing. Furthermore, for each possible
identifier u (whether u is part of the network or not) the overlay network
can efficiently and reliably compute the neighbour set ℵr(u), which consists
of r on-line nodes close to u. The definition of close varies in each of
the above mentioned systems, although it is always well-defined. We also
assume that communication within this set is inexpensive, because nodes
keep updated routing information of their neighbors. Given that the node
identifiers are distributed randomly, any neighbour set represents a random
sample of all participating nodes [CDG+02].
Off-line Karma requires every user to have his own public key pair and
a certificate that binds the public key with a node identifier. This may be
provided by a trusted Certification Authority (hereafter CA). We want to
remark that the CA is only needed when a new user joins the system. After
that communication with the CA is no longer needed.
Routing information in the overlay network is kept updated, in practice,
by node join and node leave messages and periodic queries and fingers
to detect when a node suddenly disconnects. This mechanism introduces
propagation and update delays. This is, in fact, a discrete approximation
of an ideal situation where any modification in the network topology is
instantaneously detected by the overlay network. We assume such an ideal
situation, and leave responsibility for emulating this ideal functionality in
20 Chapter 2. Protocol Design using Hashes for E-currency
an efficient fashion to the overlay network. In other words assume that
node joins and leaves are atomic operations.
We also assume that the overlay network is capable of safely distributing
a blacklist of banned users. Whenever a user detects fraud and has a proof of
that, he can submit it to the overlay network which makes this information
available to every user. How to implement the distribution of blacklist
securely is beyond the scope of this thesis. We assume that node joining
the system is expensive with respect to the benefits of fraud.
2.2.1 Notation
We write {m }u for u’s signature on message m, Cu for u’s certificate, and
validSig(m,u,Cu) for the function that checks u’s certificate Cu, and if
valid uses the key in Cu to verify a signed message m.
We also use a multisignature scheme. A multisignature scheme [OO99,
MOR01] is a signature scheme where a set R of users sign a message.
A multisignature {m }R for a message m has the same properties as if
each user in R concatenates his own traditional public key signature to
m, the only difference is that a multisignature is more efficient in size
and in verification time (comparable to a single signer Schnorr’s signature
scheme). Unlike a threshold signature scheme however, it does not provide
anonymity. We define CR = {Ci : i ∈ R} and validSig(m,R,CR) as the
function that checks all certificates in CR and verifies the multisignature.
Security of our system is parameterized by a security parameter η. All
cryptographic primitives we use satisfy the requirement that the advan-
tage of the adversary breaking them is less than 2−η. We show that the
advantage breaking our karma system is at most that large too.
For describing protocols we adopt the notation a → b : m → m′ to
denote that Alice sends a message m to Bob which he receives as m′. Also
a : f means Alice computes f . If f is a predicate, Alice verifies f ≡ true
and aborts if not.
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2.3 System Objectives and Threat Model
2.3.1 Threat Model
We consider a set of n users U of which at most t are under control of the
adversary. In the context of P2P networks, there is an important difference
in the difficulty for an adversary between adding new corrupted users to the
system and getting control over chosen user identities. Therefore, we also
define 0 ≤ c ≤ t to be the number of corrupt user identities chosen by the
adversary after they joined the overlay network. Then, when c = t we give
the adversary full control over which nodes in the overlay get corrupted,
while for c = 0 the adversary is only able to get a set of randomly chosen
user identities of size t.
Furthermore, we assume that the adversary cannot make excessively
many nodes join and leave the system, or let some nodes join and leave
in a very high frequency (in attempts to mount sybil attacks, to use them
as strawmen, or to overcome the random assignment of node identifiers).
In fact, we do not allow the adversary any control over when nodes join
the system. In practise, this could be achieved by requiring nodes to pay
each time they register, or making node joins a time-intensive procedure
(e.g., by requiring them to compute a moderately hard, memory bounded
function [ABMW05, DGN02]).
2.3.2 System Objectives
We note that for any system offering off-line currency, double-spending pre-
vention is generally speaking not possible, unless extra assumptions (e.g.,
special tamper proof hardware) are made. As we are designing an off-line
system, we only require double spending detection. We focus on the pay-
ment itself and not on the exchange of coins for goods. We do not consider
issues like fair exchange or coin stripping. These notions are the the equiv-
alent of the real life scenario where the buyer halves a banknote and gives
one half before and the other half after the goods have been delivered.
Then, the requirements on a usable, off-line and decentralized, karma
system for P2P and grid applications are the following.
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Scalability Transaction cost should be independent of the number of users
in the network.
No centralized control The system should not rely on one or several
central or special nodes such as banks or brokers and should not
require any non-flat hierarchy. We do allow a centralized registration
procedure.
Load Balance The overhead of the protocol must be, on average, evenly
distributed over the peers.
Availability Transactions among users can be processed uninterrupted
even when users join or leave the system.
Unforgeability It should be infeasible to forge coins, after an initial amount.
Double-spending detection The system must detect double-spending,
and for every double spent coin, a fraudulent user must be blacklisted
with overwhelming probability.
2.4 The Off-Line Karma Protocol
2.4.1 Informal Description
To implement the CPU cycles battery metaphor presented in the intro-
duction, a user can mint coins by finding collisions on a hash function (a
la hashcash [Bac97]). This rather expensive minting process is preferred
over giving an initial amount of free coins to new users, as in that case the
system becomes vulnerable to users changing their identities after spend-
ing those coins. A minted coin contains the name of the minting user as
well as a sequence number (limiting the number of coins a single user can
mint). User identity and sequence number together constitute the unique
coin identity. Coins also contain a time stamp recording the time they were
minted.
The coins are transferable [CP92]. A user can pay for resources by trans-
ferring a coin to another user. The sender signs the coin, thus committing
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to the change of ownership. Then, the receiver verifies this signature and
stores the coin (with signature) for further use. With every transfer, a coin
is extended with another signature. Thus, the sequence of signatures on a
coin records the payment history of that coin. Double-spending is detected
by comparing the history of two coins with the same coin identity, and the
culprit (or his accomplice) will be found at the node where both histories
fork. This check is performed whenever a coin is reminted. Fraudulent
nodes are blacklisted, together with a proof of their misbehavior (namely
two signatures of the fraudulent node over the same coin). This prevents
unfair blacklisting. Double-spending among corrupted nodes is not consid-
ered double-spending unless at some point two or more honest users get
the same coin.
Every once in a while (but at least before the coin expires), coins must be
reminted. Reminting is used to detect double-spending, and at the same
time to reduce the size of the coin by removing its history. In classical
systems, reminting is done by a central bank. Here the function of the
bank is distributed over a set of users on the network called the reminters
for the coin. The set of reminters is constructed in such a way that
• at least one of the reminters is a non-corrupted node, and
• all honest reminters possess the history of previously reminted coins
with the same identity.
We first describe the static case where we assume to have a set of n users
which are always on-line and later, in Section 2.4.3 we describe the modifi-
cations needed for handling dynamic networks, where users join and leave
at arbitrary times.
2.4.2 Off-Line Karma for Static Networks
Minting At the beginning, users need to have an initial amount of karma;
otherwise no one in the system would be able to pay for any service. An
obvious solution would be to give new users an initial amount of karma,
but a dishonest user could spend this karma without ever contributing to
the system. A better approach is to allow users to mint their own coins.
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For the minting process it is also necessary to spend CPU time in solving a
cryptographic puzzle. Our proposal is to do it a la hashcash [Bac97] in the
case of payment for CPU cycles. In a more general case, any proof that the
minter has wasted at least as much resources as the karma coin is worth
is sufficient. This puzzle is bond to the issuers identity and also to a time
stamp, to avoid being reused by an adversary. Although expensive, it is
still possible for a malign user to keep minting new coins forever. In this
scenario the system has an increasing amount of coins, but constant po-
tential computer power (our asset), so we are in presence of an inflationary
system, which is not desirable given that each coin introduces some over-
load. Therefore we need a boundary for the amount of coins each user can
mint otherwise the system becomes vulnerable to abuse or hyper-minting,
where users just mint new coins and do not contribute providing services
to the community. We prevent that by having a fixed length serial number
on each coin and users are not allowed to use the same serial number twice,
which would be considered double-spending.
Let h1 : A → C and h2 : B → C be mutually collision resistant hash
functions. Note that such functions exist and can be constructed from any
collision resistant function H, for instance, by adding some constant prefix
to its input, i.e., h1 = H(c1, x), h2(x) = H(c2, x) for suitable constants
c1, c2. Now suppose that every user is allowed to mint 2q karma coins.
A user u has to spend some CPU time finding a collision y satisfying:
h1(x) = h2(y) and x 6= y, with2
x = u||sn︸ ︷︷ ︸
coinId
||ts
where sn is the serial number |sn| ≤ q and ts is a time stamp. This is
an expensive but feasible operation, for suitable functions h1 and h2. In
analogy with the monetary system, imagine that the cost of the metal
needed for minting a coin is greater than its nominal value. We define the
new karma coin as
k0 = 〈x, y〉
2|| denotes bitstring concatenation
2.4. The Off-Line Karma Protocol 25
The function id takes a karma coin and returns the coin identifier of
that coin, in this example u||sn.
Spending To spend a coin, a user u transfers ownership of it to the
merchant m, by signing the coin together with the identity of the merchant
m and a random challenge z chosen by the merchant. The random challenge
is included to avoid uncertainty about the culprit in the case where a user
spends the same coin twice at the same merchant. Otherwise, a fair user
might look like the double-spender (unless he keeps history of all received
coins indefinitely). Concretely, suppose that the user s owns the coin ki
and wants to spend it at the merchant m. Then, the latter sends a random
challenge z to the former, who computes:
ki+1 = {ki, z,m,Cu}u
and sends it to m. The merchant m will then verify the hash collision, the
complete signature chain and make sure that his own challenge nonce and
identities are included.
Reminting To prevent the coins from growing unreasonably large and to
bound the amount of history that needs to be kept, coins must be reminted
regularly. This procedure is enforced by letting the coins expire otherwise.
Assume that there is a maximum time to live T for a coin. Then, this coin
must be reminted within time T since the creation or last remint of this
coin.
In a general micropayment schemes, this process is performed at the
bank. In our system, instead, the bank functionality is performed by a
random but predefined set of users Rk. The selection of this set must be
done in such a way that
• each user is responsible for reminting roughly the same amount of
coins (load balance) and
• at least one honest user is a member of the remint set.
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Whenever a user u has to remint a coin k, he sends it to each user in the
remint set Rk = ℵr(h(id(k))). Here, a collision resistant hash function
h is used as a consistent mapping from the coin identifiers space to the
user identifier space Π. Each user in Rk must verify the authenticity of k
and store it in his local history database. If the verification succeeds, the
reminters will create a multisignature
knew = {XY(k), ts, Rk, CRk , u}Rk
for the new coin with the same coin identifier and owner, but with a new
time stamp (XY() extracts the hash collision out of k). If the verification
fails, either because the coin is invalid or because a coin with the same
identifier and time stamp was already reminted, the reminters will audit
the coin and trace back the cheater in the signature chain.
Protocol Description.
Minting
For a user u:
Initially: Ku := ∅; snu := 0
snu := snu + 1
ts := now()
x := u||snu||ts
Find y satisfying: h1(x) = h2(y)
k := 〈x, y〉
Ku := Ku ∪ {k}
Spending
User u spends a coin at merchant m:
m : pick a nonce z
m→ u : z
u : select k ∈ Ku
u→ m : {k, z,m,Cu}u → k′
m : check(m, k′, z)
u : Ku := Ku\{k}
m : Km := Km ∪ {k′}
where now() returns the current time and Ku is the bag of coins owned by
user u
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Reminting
User u remints a coin k = {k˜, z, u, Cs}s:
u : R = ℵr(h(id(k)))
u→ ri : k, now(), R→ k′, t′, R′ ∀i : ri ∈ R
ri : t′ ≈ now()
R′ = ℵr(h(id(k′)))
check(u, k′,⊥)
verifyHistory(k′)
knew := {XY(k′), t′, R′, C ′R, u}
R↔ u : {knew}R → kR (this is a three-round protocol)
u : checkBase(u, kR)
check(u, k, z) :
if isBase(k) then checkBase(u, k)
else {k′, z′, u′, Cs}s := k
return (z′ = z ∨ z = ⊥) ∧ u′ = u
∧ validSig(k, s, Cs) ∧ check(s, k′,⊥)
checkBase(u, k):
if isReminted(k) then
{k′, newts,R′, CR, u′}R := k
return u′ = u ∧ R′ = R = ℵr(h(id(k′)))
∧newts ∈ [now()− T, now()]
∧ validSig(k,R,CR)
else
〈x, y〉 := k
u′||sn||ts := x
return h1(x) = h2(y) ∧ u′ = u
∧ ts ∈ [now()− T, now()]
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audit(k, k′):
{. . . {k0, z1, u1, C0}u0 . . . , zl, ul, Cl−1}ul−1 := k
{. . . {k′0, z′1, u′1, C ′0}u′0 . . . , z′l′ , u′l′ , C ′l′−1}ul′−1 := k′
for i = 1 to min(l, l′) do
if (zi 6= z′i ∨ ui 6= u′i) then return ui−1
verifyHistory(k):
Hk := {k′ ∈ H| id(k) = id(k′) ∧ (¬ isReminted(k) ∨ ts(k) = ts(k′))}
foreach k′ ∈ Hk do
B := B ∪ {audit(k, k′)}
H := H ∪ {k}
return Hk = ∅
where B is the set containing all the blacklisted users and H is the set of
all reminted coins, i.e., the remint history.
Security Analysis.
We will show that our protocol is secure by showing that for every double-
spent coin, a corrupted node will get blacklisted.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let r be the size of the remint set R. If r > γη + c, for
some constant γ, then the probability that R contains no honest nodes is
less than 2−η.
Proof. Since c nodes can be corrupted by the adversary at will, r must be
larger than c which is ensured by the condition r > γη + c. So we need to
see how large the probability is that the remaining r − c nodes happen to
be taken form the remaining t − c corrupted nodes when constructing the
set R. We define a stochastic variable X equal to the number of honest
nodes in R, given that c nodes in R are already corrupted. We want
P(X = 0) < 2−η (2.0)
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were η is our security parameter. As c < r < n and t < n we have
P(X = 0) =
(
t−c
r−c
)(
n−r+c
c
)(
n
r
) < (t−cr−c)(n−c
r−c
)
=
(t− c) . . . (t− r + 1)
(n− c) . . . (n− r + 1)
<
(
t− c
n− c
)r−c
and we want(
t− c
n− c
)r−c
=
(
n− c
t− c
)c−r
< 2−η
(c− r) log
(
n− c
t− c
)
< −η
r ≥ η
log
(
n−c
t−c
) + c .
Take γ =
(
log
(
n−c
t−c
))−1
. Note that γ becomes independent of t and n
when t < n2 . This completes the proof.
Lemma 2.4.2. Let k be a karma coin and t = ts(k). Then there is no
relevant information (i.e., that leads to double-spending detection) in k after
time t+ T .
Proof. The proof is split in two cases.
• If k is never double-spent in the period [t, t + T ] then there is no
relevant information at all.
• If k is double-spent first at time t′ with t < t′ < t+ T then:
– If k is reminted before t′ then the new coin kˆ with ts(kˆ) > t
will contain relevant information to prove double-spending and
therefore there is no relevant information in k.
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– If k was not reminted before t′ then both double-spent coins k1
and k2 must be reminted at least once before t+ T (they would
expire otherwise). Then any double-spending attested by k is
detected before t+ T .
Theorem 2.4.3. Whenever a coin is double-spent, that coin expires or one
corrupted node is identified.
Proof. Whenever a coin is double-spent, both coins have the same identifier
and time stamp. It is not possible for an adversary to change any of them:
in case of a just minted coin they are protected by being part of the collision
of the hash functions; and in the case of a re-minted coin it is not possible
for an adversary to forge the multisignature, since Lemma 2.4.1 ensures that
there is always a fair user in every remint set. Then, coins with the same
identifier must be sent to the same remint set before their expiration time,
otherwise they expire and the condition of the theorem holds. Therefore,
at least one fair user u˙ must receive both coins before their expiration time.
Let ki1 and ki2 be the first remint request of each version of the double-
spent coin ki, received by u˙ after the double-spending. Then, u˙ detects
fraud and calls audit(ki1 , ki2). audit first checks whether the signatures
are valid. It is clear that a user endorsing a coin with an invalid signature
or that is improperly minted is faulty (he should have checked it). If that
is not the case, then the coin is fairly minted and id(ki1) = id(ki2), at least
the first user endorsing the coin is the same in ki1 and ki2 . Therefore, and
given the fact that both coins are different, there must be one user in the
signature chain that transferred the coin to two different users (or to the
same user twice). In this case the user identities inside of the signature are
different (or the challenge nonces are different), which constitutes a proof
of double-spending.
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2.4.3 Handling Dynamic Networks
In a static network, the remint set Rk for a coin k never changes. That
makes it easy to verify that a given coin was fairly reminted at some point in
the past, as verifying a remint set is as trivial as checkingRk = ℵr(h(id(k))).
In a dynamic network, it is not possible to be so restrictive while defining
a valid remint set. Otherwise every time a user u ∈ Rk is off-line, the coin
k cannot be reminted, and therefore may expire. On the other hand, the
selection of the users in R should somehow be predefined in order to limit
the influence of the adversary, and at least allow the validity of the remint
set to be reliably determined at a later time (unless we require r > t, which
trivially implies that at least one fair node is in the remint set).
As a solution we define a valid remint set for a coin k, as the closest
r users to h(id(k)) in the identifier space, that are on-line at remint time.
Then the verification of the fairness of a remint set is difficult, given that
the verifier has no information about the state of the network at remint
time. An adversary could try to unfairly construct a remint set with only
nodes that are under his control, by claiming that all other (fair) users
were off-line at remint time. We are going to prevent this kind of attack by
taking the dispersion of the remint set R as an indicator for the authenticity
of the coin. We define the dispersion of a remint as
d(Rk) = max
i∈Rk
|i− h(id(k))| ,
assuming that closeness on the overlay network is equivalent to identifier
difference.
Let us assume that the dispersion of the overlay network does not change
very fast. Meaning that it is very unlikely, in a worldwide network with
a large amount of users, to have big fluctuations in the amount of users
connected to it, in short periods of time. Let α be the maximal rate of
change for the dispersion of the overlay network over any interval of length
at most σ, i.e. if T is the maximal time to live for a coin, and d(t) is
the dispersion at time t, then for all t′ between t and t + T , we have
1
αd(t) ≤ d(t′) ≤ αd(t).
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We call a remint set acceptable (for a coin) if it satisfies our constraints
on the remint set, and does not contain members beyond the boundaries
specified by the dispersion. In such a scenario, an adversary does not have
much freedom while selecting the users in R without drastically increasing
d(r).
Another issue that needs to be addressed in a dynamic network is the
history transfer between users. The neighborhood Rk for a coin k should
keep (as an invariant) the history of any reminted coin within the period
[ts(k), ts(k) + T ]. Given that the history consists of signed coins, it is
not possible for an adversary to forge it. Therefore, a joining user can just
renew its history by querying its neighbors for it and a leaving node has to
broadcast his recent history to its neighborhood.
checkBase(u, k):
if isReminted(k) then
{k′, newts,R′, CR, u′}R := k
return u′ = u ∧ R′ = R
∧newts ∈ [now()− T, now()]
∧ d(R) ≤ αd(now())
∧ validSig(k,R,CR)
else
〈x, y〉 := k
u′||sn||ts := x
return h1(x) = h2(y)
∧u′ = u ∧ ts ∈ [now()− T, now()]
The only modification that remains, with respect to the static version,
is in the function checkBase, which now verifies that the dispersion of the
remint set is not too big, instead of checking equality with the neighbor-
hood.
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Security Analysis.
We analyze security of the dynamic protocol similar to the static case.
Proposition 2.4.4 (Hoeffding bound). For a hyper-geometrically distri-
buted random variable X, representing the number of successes among n
draws, with probability p of success, we have [Hoe63, Chv79]
P(X ≥ np+ g) ≤ e−2g2/n
Lemma 2.4.5. Let p = t−cn−c , fix β such that c ≤ βr, and suppose β+α2p <
1. If r ∈ O
(
α2η
(1−β−pα2)2
)
, then any acceptable remint set contains at least
one honest node with probability 1− 2−η.
Proof. The remint set is fixed at remint time t. The adversary needs to pick
r nodes for the remint set such that it does not violate the acceptability
condition d(R) ≤ αd(t′), which is checked the next time the coin is reminted
at time t′ ≤ t + T . At time t′, the density d(t′) ≤ αd(t). This means that
at time t the adversary can, at best, select r nodes among the α2r nodes
with closer id to h(id(k)), for a coin k. Then he can still take control over
c of them. Therefore, he succeeds if among these α2r nodes there are r− c
faulty ones.
Let X be a random variable representing the number of faulty nodes
in such a sample of α2r nodes from all n nodes (t− c of which are faulty).
Then the adversary is successful if X ≥ r − c. X is distributed according
to the hyper-geometric distribution, with p = t−cn−c , and we are interested in
bounding
P(X ≥ r − c) ≤P(X ≥ r − βr) {β + α2p < 1}
=P(X ≥ pα2r + (r − βr − pα2r)) {Hoeffding bound}
≤ e−2(r−βr−pα2r)2/α2r
= e−2r(1−β−pα
2)2/α2
which we want to be less than 2−η. Then, by taking logarithms
(−2r(1− β − pα2)2/α2) log2 e < −η
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and hence
r ≥ α
2η
2(1− β − pα2)2 log2 e
which completes the proof.
Lemma 2.4.6. In every remint set, fair nodes can always transmit their
remint history to another fair node before leaving.
Proof. As a corollary of Lemma 2.4.5 and given the assumption that node
joins and leaves are atomic operations, at least two fair nodes must be in a
valid remint set, whenever a fair node is going to leave it. This fact, together
with the secure routing assumption over the overlay network, implies that
fair users can always transmit their remint history to another fair node
before leaving.
Theorem 2.4.7. Let p = t−cn−c , fix β such that c ≤ βr, and suppose
β + α2p < 1 and r ∈ O
(
α2η
(1−β−pα2)2
)
. Then whenever a coin is double-
spent, that coin expires or one corrupted node is identified with overwhelm-
ing probability.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2.4.3 also applies here provided that the
remint set has at least one fair node and that the system is history preserv-
ing. The former condition follows from lemma 2.4.5 except with negligible
probability on η. The latter condition follows from lemma 2.4.6.
2.5 Early Double-spending Detection
In some scenarios double-spending detection might not be good enough.
This is the case when an adversary is able to add new corrupted nodes
easily. It is possible for a corrupted user who owns a karma coin, to spend
it many times and very quickly, especially when the coin is just minted
(or reminted). Although those actions are eventually going to be detected,
this is not going to happen until the first two remint requests of this coin
are submitted. This user of course is going to be punished, but then the
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adversary might get another Id and repeat this operation. To counteract
this kind of attacks, besides making it harder for an adversary to get new
ids, it is possible to detect double-spending early. As a first line of defence,
when a user receives a new coin, he performs a search over the coins he
possess looking for duplicated identifiers. In case he succeeds, the double-
spender is immediately blacklisted. The probability of finding a duplicated
coin just like that is small, especially when the number of copies is not
too big. To improve this, we introduce coin attractors to the system. An
attractor is a user, whose hashed id is the closest to the hashed id of the
coin. Then, when a user s wants to spend a coin at the merchant m, s
searches over his coins for the one which has the minimum distance with
the merchant’s hashed id,
kd = min
k∈Ks
|h(m)− h(id(k))| ,
and pays with it. Even thought faulty nodes may avoid sending coin to
attractors, eventually a good node will do so. At that point the attractor
will detect the double spending.
2.6 Conclusions
We have presented a completely decentralized, off-line karma implemen-
tation for P2P and grid systems, that detects double-spending and other
types of fraud under varying adversarial scenarios. This is, so far, the first
system for truly off-line karma coins, which can be used in highly dynamic
peer-to-peer networks and grid systems. Our system has smaller message
complexity than previously proposed systems of similar characteristics, un-
der certain scenarios. In particular, we are able to completely replace a
central bank by a distributed remint set whose size is roughly proportional
to the security parameter η.

Chapter 3
Protocol Analysis of
Anonymity in the Formal
Setting
3.1 Introduction
There is a growing concern about the amount of personal information that
is being gathered about people’s actions. Websites habitually track people’s
browsing behavior, banks track people’s financial whereabouts, and current
trends in applications of RFID chips will make it possible to track people’s
physical location. Furthermore, several European governments oblige In-
ternet Service Providers to keep traffic logs of all communication on the
Internet.
To protect users from undesired information leaks, there are various
protocols and tools that provide some form of anonymity, e.g., for web
browsing and e-mailing; for instance Tor [DMS04], Freenet [CSWH01], and
Mixminion [DDM03].
Anonymizing Protocols In 1981, Chaum [Cha81] pioneered the idea
of what are currently called Chaum mixes. If A wants to send a message
m to B, she chooses a number of relays, say R1, R2, and sends a message
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{|R2, {|B, {|m|}B|}R2 |}R1 to R1. Here {| . . . |}X denotes encryption with the
public key of agent X. Relay R1 decrypts the first layer of encryption
and forwards the message {|B, {|m|}B|}R2 to R2, who peels off another layer
and sends the remainder to B. Traffic analysis is complicated as every relay
queues messages until a certain number have been received and relays them
in a batch. Also, dummy network traffic can be generated if not enough
messages are available. This technique forms the basis of Onion Routing
[GRS96] and its successor Tor [DMS04], a currently running network of
relays providing anonymous communication for instance with web servers.
Another idea to provide some kind of anonymity was proposed by Reiter
and Rubin in [RR98]; the idea is to use so called crowds. The message m is
sent to a relay R1, which then probabilistically either forwards the message
to another relay R2, or to its final destination. A key idea here is that every
member of the network can act as a relay.
Various notions of anonymous communication exist and various attacker
models have to be considered. Chaum mixes typically provide sender
anonymity: the ultimate receiver B of the message m does not know who
originated the message. It also provides unlinkability: someone observing
all network traffic cannot tell that A and B are communicating.
Crowds does not provide unlinkability: a global eavesdropper will be
able to see the message m passing through the whole network and will see
the message m moving from A to B over a number of relays. However, it
does provide sender anonymity even if some of the members of the network
are corrupted.
Formal methods For security and authentication, a number of formal
methods and automated tools have been developed to determine the cor-
rectness of security and authentication protocols (see, e.g., [AG97, Pau98,
JHar, Gut01]). In contrast, the formalization of anonymity is still in its
infancy. This chapter presents a formal framework in which various infor-
mation hiding properties can be expressed in a clear and precise manner.
It enables us to formulate competing notions of anonymity in a uniform
fashion and compare them.
Our contribution and related work Starting point of our approach,
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also present in [HO05], is the idea that various information hiding prop-
erties can best be expressed in the language of epistemic logic [FHMV95].
As all these properties are related to what principals know, this approach
arises naturally. Epistemic (modal) logic reasons about what agents know
and believe. In order to do so, the reasoning capacities of the agents are
idealized. For instance, it is assumed that agents never forget anything and
that they extract as much information as possible from what they see. In
this way, clear inference rules can be formulated. Then, it is possible to
reason about what each principal knows at a specific point in time.
This makes it possible to reason not only about the messages in a run,
but also about the knowledge agents gain from these messages. For in-
stance, sender anonymity can typically be formulated as the receiver not
knowing who sent a certain message.
Central in the epistemic framework is our notion of observational equiv-
alence of runs. An agent knows a fact of a certain run r if that fact is true
in all possible worlds, i.e., in all runs that are observationally equivalent to
r. In [HO05], the observational equivalence is basically assumed, whereas
we actually construct such a relation.
Our notion of observational equivalence takes care of the cryptographic
operations that are defined on the set of messages.
We should remark that other works present similar equivalence relations
on the set of messages, e.g., [MVdV04, AR02, MVdV07]. Ours is unique in
the sense that it not only deals with whether or not messages are encrypted,
but also takes care of relations between ciphertexts and hash values. Es-
pecially for dealing with unlinkability this is essential. For example, if an
agent A sends a message {|m|}k and another agent B either sends the mes-
sage hash({|m|}k) (for instance, to acknowledge receipt of A’s message), or
the message {|m|}k (for instance, forwarding it to someone else), then a
global observer could link A and B, even though all messages involved look
like random bitstrings to this global observer.
Note that this formal approach is possibilistic in nature: it only consid-
ers whether or not it is possible that A and B are communicating, but not
the probability that they are. There is another body of literature studying
probabilistic aspects of anonymity, e.g., [Shm04, Ser04]. These papers gen-
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erally assume the correctness of the anonymizing protocols in the formal
message sense and then compute measures of anonymity.
We will show that this epistemic framework allows us to formally de-
scribe and verify various information hiding properties that are considered
in the literature.
Organization of this chapter We start in Section 3.2 with the definition
of the message algebra. Then Section 3.3 fixes the network and intruder
model and describes the fundamental notion of observational equivalence of
runs. Section 3.4 introduces the epistemic operators and shows how these
operators can be used to express various information hiding properties, such
as sender anonymity and unlinkability. Finally, to illustrate the power of
our approach, we consider in Section 3.5 abstract versions of Crowds and
Onion Routing and formally prove their anonymizing properties. We also
consider a version of Onion Routing that has a subtle error and show how
our framework is capable of detecting this flaw.
Notations and terminology Throughout this chapter a secret key is
called a symmetric key. In an asymmetric encryption a key pair consists of
a public key and a private key.
We clearly distinguish the verbs to know and to possess: an agent knows
a fact while it possesses a message. The former acts as an epistemic oper-
ator which is applied to a proposition on the run, while the latter concerns
accessibility to messages via cryptographic operations such as encryption
or decryption.
The set X∗ consists of all the finite lists overX, that is, X∗ =
∐
n∈NX
n.
For a list r with length |r|, the i-th element of r is denoted by ri. The head-
closed sublist 〈r0, r1, . . . , ri−1〉 of r is denoted by r<i.
3.2 The message algebra
In this section we present our model of the message algebra, and introduce
the closure operator on a set of messages. This is done in a standard way
similar to [Pau98, JHar].
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Definition 3.2.1. (Message algebra) Agent is an infinite set of agents
identifiers, Key is an infinite set of key symbols, Nonce an infinite set
of nonce symbols. Agents are denoted by A,B, . . . , keys are denoted by
k, k′, . . . , nonces by n, n′, . . . . Using these building blocks, messages are
constructed using encryption, hashing, and pairing operations:
Msg 3 m := A | n | k | enc(m, k) | hash(m) | 〈m,m〉.
We also assume that there is a function (−)−1 from keys to keys with
the property that (k−1)−1 = k. If k−1 = k, then k is called a symmetric
key, otherwise one of k and k−1 is called a private key and the other one a
public key.
We do not include a specific type for data, as it can be modeled using
nonces. This is straightforward as we need to define the ‘identity of a
message’ and using nonces we get that for free.
Remark 3.2.1. Throughout this chapter we abstract from subtle issues
regarding the length of the ciphertexts. In practical implementations of
these protocols it is necessary to take care of this issue. The general guide-
line is that all encryptions should look alike to the adversary. This can be
achieved using padding. For instance, as it is done in some variants of onion
routing: take the maximum-length ciphertext (which should be constant,
as a system requirement) of the protocol and make sure that every other
ciphertext has that length, by concatenating a random bitstring at the end.
We abbreviate enc(m, k) to {|m|}k and omit angle brackets inside encryp-
tions. Typically, an agent A has an associated public key and we de-
note encryption with the public key of A simply by {|m|}A. Terms in
Agent ∪Nonce ∪Key are said to be primitive.
Definition 3.2.2 (Sub-message). Define the relation sub-message, nota-
tion ¹, as the smallest reflexive and transitive relation satisfying
1. m1 ¹ 〈m1,m2〉
2. m2 ¹ 〈m1,m2〉
42 Chapter 3. Protocol Analysis of Anonymity in the Formal Setting
3. m ¹ {|m|}k
4. m ¹ hash(m) .
Note that this relation is unaware of cryptographic operations; e.g., m ¹
{|m|}k and m ¹ hash(m) always hold.
Furthermore, a function pi : Msg → Msg is said to be structure pre-
serving if it maps names to names, nonces to nonces, keys to keys, en-
crypted messages to encrypted messages, hashes to hashes, and satisfies
pi(〈m1,m2〉) = 〈pi(m1), pi(m2)〉 for all messages m1 and m2. Note that
pi(hash(m)) = hash(m′) but not necessarily with m′ = pi(m). Similarly for
encryption.
The closure U of a set U of messages consists of all the messages that
can be extracted and constructed from those in U using cryptographic
operations such as decryption, encryption, tupling and decomposing tuples.
The formal definition follows
Definition 3.2.2 (Closure). Let U be a set of messages. The closure of U ,
denoted by U , is the smallest set of messages satisfying:
1. U ⊆ U ;
2. if {|m|}k, k−1 ∈ U , then m ∈ U ;
3. if 〈m1,m2〉 ∈ U , then m1,m2 ∈ U ;
4. if m, k ∈ U , then {|m|}k ∈ U ;
5. if m ∈ U , then hash(m) ∈ U ;
6. if m1,m2 ∈ U , then 〈m1,m2〉 ∈ U .
This closure operation is important here for two reasons. One reason,
which is common in formal modelling of security protocols, is that an agent
may send only the messages he can construct from what he has seen (see
Definition 3.3.4). The other one is that the closure of the possessions of an
agent restricts the set of runs that the agent considers to be observationally
equivalent to a given run (see Definition 3.3.8).
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3.3 Runs and observational equivalence
3.3.1 Network model
To model anonymity properties, we have to be able to talk about the sender
and receiver of a message. Therefore we include explicit sender and receiver
information in our notion of event below. In a real world setting, an event
would correspond to an IP package, which has sender and receiver infor-
mation in the header and the actual message in the body.
Definition 3.3.1. (Agents, events) We denote by AG a non-empty set of
agents, which has a special element spy for the intruder. An agent which is
not spy is called a regular agent. An event is a triple (A,B,m) of the sender
A, the recipient B and the delivered message m. To make the intention
clear we denote the above event by (A → B : m). The set of all events is
denoted by Event.
Definition 3.3.2. (Runs) A run is a finite list of events, i.e. an element of
the set Run := Event∗. A run describes all the events that have occurred
in a network. The function msg : Run→ P(Msg) extracts all the messages
occurring in a run. That is,
msg
(
(A0 → B0 : m0),
(A1 → B1 : m1),
...
(An−1 → Bn−1 : mn−1)
)
= {m0,m1, . . . ,mn−1}.
3.3.2 Attacker model
It is standard to verify security properties such as authentication or secrecy
under the Dolev-Yao intruder model [DY83]. In that model the network is
completely under the control of the intruder, hence no agent can be sure
who sent the message it receives, or whether the intended recipient actually
receives the message sent.
44 Chapter 3. Protocol Analysis of Anonymity in the Formal Setting
To model anonymity properties, it is customary to use a weaker attacker
model. We assume that the intruder is passive, i.e., observes all network
traffic, but does not actively modify it. It is however possible that some
regular agents are corrupted; we will later model this in terms of the keys
the intruder possesses. This setting enables us to express that a run of a
protocol satisfies a certain information hiding property as long as certain
agents are not corrupted. Contrary to the intruder, the regular agents are
not necessarily aware of all the events in the run; we adopt the convention
that they only see the events in which they are involved as sender or receiver.
Definition 3.3.3. (Visible part of runs) Let r be a run. For a regular agent
A ∈ AG \ {spy} the A-visible part of r, denoted by r|A, is the sublist of
r consisting of all the events that have A in either sender or receiver field.
The spy-visible part of r, denoted by r|spy, is identical to r.
3.3.3 Communication protocol
It is important to specify the set of runs of a protocol, which is the set of
possible worlds used in the definition of knowledge. There, runs which are
illegitimate with respect to a protocol are excluded because every agent
knows that those runs cannot happen. In that sense, a protocol is common
knowledge. In this chapter a protocol consists of two components, namely
the candidate runs and the initial possessions.
The set of candidate runs is just a set of runs. Intuitively, it consists of
those runs which fulfill the requirements on which messages may/must be
sent by an agent. In the examples (see Section 3.5) we describe the set of
candidate runs.
An initial possession function IPo : AG → P(Msg) assigns to each
agent the set of messages the agent possesses before communication takes
place. Typically an agent’s initial possessions consists of its private key and
the public keys of all agents. We require that, for every agent A, IPo(A)
consists of only primitive messages.
We denote by PossIPo(r,A, i) the set of the messages that an agent A
possesses at stage i of the run r. It is the closure of the union of: 1)
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A’s initial possession IPo(A); 2) the messages A has seen up to this point,
msg
(
(r<i) |A
)
; 3) the nonces and secret keys A has freshly generated at
stage i. The set PossIPo(r,A, i) consists of all messages the agent A can
possibly construct after having seen the first i messages of the run.
Definition 3.3.4. A run r ∈ Run is said to be legitimate with respect to an
initial possession function IPo : AG→ P(Msg) if, for every i ∈ [0, |r| − 1],
mi ∈ PossIPo(r,Ai, i), where (Ai → Bi : mi) = ri.
Definition 3.3.5. (Protocols and runs of protocol) A protocol is a pair
(cr, IPo) consisting of a set of candidate runs cr and an initial possession
function IPo. A run r ∈ Run is said to be a run of a protocol (cr, IPo)
if r ∈ cr and is legitimate with respect to the initial possession function
IPo. This captures the notion that principals cannot guess keys or nonces
they have not seen or generated. The set of runs of a protocol (cr, IPo) is
denoted by Runcr,IPo.
Note that in the literature (e.g., [FHMV95]) a protocol is often given
locally, by specifying what kind of messages an agent can send in a certain
situation. For our theory, the way of specifying a protocol is unimportant;
therefore we abstract from this specification by considering a given set of
candidate runs.
3.3.4 Observational equivalence
If an agent receives an encrypted message for which it does not have the
decryption key, this message looks just like a random bitstring. This section
formalizes this idea by defining the notion of observational equivalence.
Intuitively, two sequences of messages look the same to an agent if they are
the same for the messages the agent understands and if a message in one
sequence looks like a random bitstring to the agent, then the corresponding
message in the other sequence also looks like a random bitstring. Matters
are slightly more complicated: we have to take care of the case where a
specific random looking bitstring occurs more than once in a sequence of
messages; we have to take care of the possibility for someone to understand
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only a submessage of a message; we also have to take care of the case where
certain messages look like random bitstrings to the agent, but are still
somehow related. For example, if the agent does not possess the symmetric
key k, two messages m1 = {|m|}k and m2 = hash({|m|}k) both look like
random bitstrings. Still the agent can derive a relationship between them,
namely m2 = hash(m1).
This motivates our definition of observational equivalence below. The
definition is typically applied with U being equal to PossIPo(r,A, |r| − 1),
the set of messages that an agent A possesses after the run has finished.
Definition 3.3.6. (Reinterpretations of messages) Let pi be a structure
preserving permutation on the set Msg of messages and let U ⊆ Msg be
a set of messages. The map pi is said to be a semi-reinterpretation under
U if it satisfies the following conditions:
pi(p) = p for primitive terms p
pi({|m|}k) = {|pi(m)|}k if m, k are in U , or
if {|m|}k, k−1 are in U
pi(hash(m)) = hash(pi(m)) if m is in U .
The map pi is called a reinterpretation under U if it is a semi-reinterpreta-
tion under U and if pi−1 is a semi-reinterpretation under pi(U) as well.
The above definition says that as far as an agent can observe (i.e., for all the
messages in U), the permutation pi preserves structural and cryptographic
relationships between messages. We extend reinterpretations naturally to
events (applying pi to the message field of an event) and to runs (applying
pi to the message field of every event in a run).
Lemma 3.3.7. Let U be a set of messages.
1. The identity map on the set of messages is a reinterpretation under
U .
2. For every reinterpretation pi under U , its inverse pi−1 is a reinterpre-
tation under pi(U).
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3. For all reinterpretations pi under U and pi′ under pi(U), their compo-
sition pi′ ◦ pi is a reinterpretation under U .
Proof. Trivial. Note that 3 is already true for semi-reinterpretations.
Definition 3.3.8. (Observational equivalence of runs) Let r, r′ ∈ Runcr,IPo
be two runs of a protocol (cr, IPo) and let A ∈ AG be an agent. Two runs r
and r′ are said to be observationally equivalent for an agent A, denoted by
r ∼=A r′, if there exists a reinterpretation pi under PossIPo(r,A, |r| − 1) such
that pi(r|A) = r′|A . Such a reinterpretation will be called a reinterpretation
for A.
Lemma 3.3.9. For each agent A ∈ AG, the relation ∼=A on Runcr,IPo is
an equivalence relation.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.3.7. Note that pi
(
PossIPo(r,A, |r|−1)
)
=
PossIPo(pi(r), A, |r| − 1)
)
since IPo(A) consists solely of primitive messages
and since a reinterpretation does not change the sender and receiver fields
of events.
Example 3.3.10. Consider the following two runs in which A and A′ are
sending the messages m and m′ to B via a single relay, or Chaum mix, M .
Below n and n′ are fresh nonces.
r r′
(A→M : {|n,B, {|m|}B|}M ) (A→M : {|n′, B, {|m′|}B|}M )
(A′ →M : {|n′, B, {|m′|}B|}M ) (A′ →M : {|n,B, {|m|}B|}M )
(M → B : {|m|}B) (M → B : {|m|}B)
(M → B : {|m′|}B) (M → B : {|m′|}B)
Assume that the spy knows the identities of all agents, all public keys
and also the private key of B. Then these runs are still observation-
ally equivalent for the spy; we can take a reinterpretation that exchanges
{|n,B, {|m|}B|}M and {|n′, B, {|m′|}B|}M and leaves {|m|}B and {|m′|}B fixed.
It is important to realize that a reinterpretation pi for the spy must satisfy
pi({|m|}B) = {|pi(m)|}B (since B’s private key is compromised), but does not
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necessarily have to satisfy pi({|n,B, {|m|}B|}M ) = {|n,B, pi({|m|}B)|}M (and
similarly for m′).
Without the nonces, however, the runs are not observationally equiva-
lent.
r r′
(A→M : {|B, {|m|}B|}M ) (A→M : {|B, {|m′|}B|}M )
(A′ →M : {|B, {|m′|}B|}M ) (A′ →M : {|B, {|m|}B|}M )
(M → B : {|m|}B) (M → B : {|m|}B)
(M → B : {|m′|}B) (M → B : {|m′|}B)
This is because pi must satisfy pi({|B, {|m|}B|}M ) = {|B, pi({|m|}B)|}M (and
similarly form′). Note how this nicely captures the fact that, from the view-
point of the spy, the messages {|B, {|m|}B|}M and {|B, {|m′|}B|}M can indeed
be distinguished: at the end of the run the spy possesses the messages
{|m|}B and {|m′|}B and he can simply encrypt the messages 〈B, {|m|}B〉 and
〈B, {|m′|}B〉 with the public key of M . This does not hold for the version
with the nonces, since the spy never possesses these nonces.
3.4 Formulas and epistemic operators
In this section we introduce the epistemic (or modal) language as our spec-
ification language. This language will alow us to express security notions
that we can later analyze. The semantics of epistemic operators is defined
in a standard way [FHMV95], taking the set Runcr,IPo of runs of a proto-
col as the set of possible worlds equipped with observational equivalence
∼=A. Note that our language is semantics-based : a formula is identified as
a {T,F}-valued function over a model, rather than a syntactically-defined
entity.
3.4.1 Formulas
With a formula we want to express not only a fact about a run but also
that an agent knows/does not know a certain fact about a run.
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Definition 3.4.1. (Formulas) A formula ϕ is a function which takes as its
arguments a protocol (cr, IPo) and a run r ∈ Runcr,IPo of that protocol, and
returns either T or F. The set of all the formulas is denoted by Form. We
follow the tradition of logic to denote the fact ϕ(cr, IPo, r) = T, where r ∈
Runcr,IPo, by cr, IPo, r |= ϕ. Often the protocol (cr, IPo) under consideration
is clear from the context, in which case we abbreviate cr, IPo, r |= ϕ to
r |= ϕ. Logical connectives on formulas such as ∧, ∨, → and ¬ are defined
in an obvious way. A formula ϕ is said to be valid if cr, IPo, r |= ϕ for all
r ∈ Runcr,IPo.
We will use the following abbreviations Sends, Possesses, and Originates
repeatedly in the rest of this chapter. They express fundamental properties
of runs.
Definition 3.4.2. The formula A Sends m to B means: at some stage in
the run, A sends a message to B which contains m as a subterm.
r |= A Sends m to B def⇐⇒
∃i ∈ [0, |r| − 1]. (m ¹ m′ where (A→ B : m′) = ri).
We will also useA Sends m to mean thatA sends the messagem to someone.
r |= A Sends m def⇐⇒ ∃B. r |= A Sends m to B.
The formula A Possesses m means: after the run has finished, A is capable
of constructing the message m.
r |= A Possesses m def⇐⇒ m ∈ PossIPo(r,A, |r| − 1).
The formula A Originates m means that: A Sends m, and m contains a
fresh nonce or key.
r |= A Originates m def⇐⇒
∃i ∈ [0, |r| − 1].∃l ∈ Nonce ∪Key
(
l ¹ m ¹ m′ where (A→ B : m′) = ri
∧ ∀j ∈ [0, i− 1]. (l 6¹ mˆ where (A′ → A : mˆ) = rj)).
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3.4.2 Epistemic operators
Using the observational equivalence relations over the set Runcr,IPo of pos-
sible worlds defined in Section 3.3.4, we can now introduce epistemic oper-
ators in the standard way (see e.g., [FHMV95]).
Definition 3.4.3. (Epistemic operators) Let (cr, IPo) be a protocol. For
an agent A ∈ AG, the epistemic operator ¤A : Form → Form is defined
by:
cr, IPo, r |=¤Aϕ def⇐⇒
∀r′ ∈ Runcr,IPo.
(
r′ ∼=A r =⇒ cr, IPo, r′ |= ϕ
)
.
The formula ¤Aϕ is read as “after the run is completed, the agent A knows
that ϕ is true”. The formula ♦Aϕ is short for ¬¤A¬ϕ and read as “after
the run is completed, the agent A suspects that ϕ is true”.
Lemma 3.4.4 (¤A is the S5-modality). For each agent A ∈ AG, the
operator ¤A satisfies the following properties.
• (Necessitation) For each set of candidate runs cr and each initial
possession function IPo, if
(∀r ∈ Runcr,IPo. r |= ϕ), then (∀r ∈
Runcr,IPo. r |= ¤Aϕ
)
.
• The following formulas are all valid: (Distribution) ¤A(ϕ → ψ) →
(¤Aϕ → ¤Aψ); (T) ¤Aϕ → ϕ; (4) ¤Aϕ → ¤A¤Aϕ; (5) ♦Aϕ →
¤A♦Aϕ.
In short, the operator ¤A is a so-called S5-modality.
Proof. Since the epistemic operator ¤A is defined via an equivalence rela-
tion ∼=A on Runcr,IPo. See e.g., [BdRV01].
3.4.3 Expressing information hiding properties
There are a number of properties which are referred to as information hiding
properties (see e.g., [PK00]), and the meaning of some of these properties
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might be different from one application to another. As stated in the in-
troduction, we aim at, rather than a decisive definition of “anonymity”, a
framework in which we can formulate and analyze various different proper-
ties in a uniform and straightforward manner.
In this subsection we formulate some common examples of information
hiding properties in our epistemic language. We use the standard notion of
an anonymity set : it is a collection of agents among which a given agent is
not identifiable. The larger this set is, the more anonymous an agent is.
Sender anonymity Suppose that r is a run of a protocol in which an
agent B receives a message m. We say that r provides sender anonymity
with anonymity set AS if it satisfies
r |=
∧
X∈AS
♦B(X Originates m).
This means that, as far as B is concerned, every agent in the anonymity
set could have sent the message.
Unlinkability We say that a run r provides unlinkability for users A and
B with anonymity set AS if
r |= (¬¤spyϕ0(A,B)) ∧ ∧
X∈AS
♦spyϕ0(X,B) ,
where ϕ0(X,Y ) = ∃n.
(
X Sends n ∧ Y Possesses n). Intuitively, the left
side of the conjunction means that the adversary is not certain that A sent
something to B. The right side means that every other user could have sent
something to B. Similarly, unlinkability between a user A and a message
m could be defined as |= ¬¤spy(A Sends m) ∧
∧
X∈AS ♦spy(X Sends m).
Plausible deniability In certain circumstances (e.g., relays), agents
might be interested in showing that they did not know that they had some
sensitive informationm. This might be modelled by the following epistemic
formula:
r |= ¤spy¬(¤A(A Possesses m)) .
This formula is read as: the spy knows that A does not know that she
possesses m. i.e., there is a run in which A does not possess m.
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3.5 Examples
To illustrate the applicability of the theory, we analyze the anonymity of
simplified versions of Crowds and Onion Routing. For Crowds, we focus
on proving sender anonymity, whereas for Onion Routing we are concerned
with unlinkability.
3.5.1 Crowds
The Crowds system [RR98] is a system for doing anonymous web trans-
actions based on the idea that anonymity can be provided by hiding in a
crowd. Next we describe a simplified version of it. When someone wants to
send a request to a server, she randomly selects a user from a crowd of users
and asks this user to forward the request for her to the server. This user
then either forwards the request to the server, or selects another random
user from the crowd to do the forwarding. (Note: this only describes the
request part; not the reply part). For simplicity reasons, we model requests
as nonces.
A Crowds node A might perform any of the following actions
• at any time A can send a request n for server S to a relay B: (A →
B : 〈S, n〉), where n is freshly generated;
• when a message of the form (B → A : 〈S, n〉) is received, A can either
deliver it to destination: (A → S : n) or forward it to a randomly-
chosen relay C: (A→ C : 〈S, n〉).
This obviously provides sender anonymity, in the sense that the server
cannot tell from who the request really originated. In the formal framework
this can be formulated as follows:
Theorem 3.5.1. Let r be a run of Crowds in which (A → S : n) occurs
with A 6= S. Then
r |=
∧
B∈AS
♦S(B Originates n),
where the anonymity set AS is equal to AG \ {S}.
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Proof. Let B ∈ AS and take r′ = (B → A : n), r, i.e., r augmented by
a fictitious event (B → A : n). Then r′ is also a valid run and obviously
r′ |= B Originates n. Because S 6= A,B, we have r′|S = r|S and therefore
r′ ∼=S r. So r |= ♦S(B Originates n).
Against a global eavesdropper, i.e., someone who can observe all network
traffic, this does not provide anonymity. This is, of course, also remarked
in [RR98].
Theorem 3.5.2. Let r be a run of Crowds in which A freshly sends n to
S over a relay R. I.e., the run contains
(A→ R : 〈S, n〉)
and the nonce n is fresh in A→ R : 〈S, n〉. Then r |= ¤spy(A Originates n).
Proof. Suppose that r |= ¬¤spy(A Originates n). Then there is a run r′
satisfying r ∼=spy r′ where the formula r′ |= ¬(A Originates n) holds. Let pi
be the reinterpretation for spy such that pi(r) = r′. Note that pi(n) = n
and pi(S) = S. Since A did not originate n in r′, there must be an event
B → A : m with n as subterm appearing in m before the event A → R :
〈S, n〉. This message m must be of the form n or of the form 〈C, n〉 for
some agent C, since the protocol does not allow the sending of messages
of any other form and since it must have n as subterm. However, this
means that B → A : pi−1(m) occurs in r before A→ R : 〈S, n〉. Note that
pi−1(m) is of the form pi−1(n) = n or of the form pi−1(〈C, n〉) = 〈C, n〉 for
some agent C. This contradicts the fact that n appears freshly in the event
A→ R : 〈S, n〉.
3.5.2 Onion Routing
Chaum mixes were already mentioned in the introduction. Users construct
messages of the form {|R2, {|B, {|m|}B|}R2 |}R1 (called onions, because of the
layered encryptions) and use relays (R1, R2) that decrypt one layer (peel
the onion) and forward the remainder. In this section we analyze the
unlinkability of a very simple version.
An agent in the set AG belongs to one of the following families:
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1. Onion routers who try to disguise causal relations between incoming
and outgoing messages by peeling onions (i.e., removing one layer
of encryption) and forwarding them. The router collects incoming
messages until it has received k messages. Then, the messages are
permuted and sent in batch to their respective intended destinations.
2. Users who try to communicate with one another unlinkably, with the
help of the onion router.
3. The intruder denoted by spy.
In the sequel we assume that there is only a single router denoted by
M (note that M is of type router, in contrast with users X,Y, . . . ). Fur-
thermore the initial possession function IPo is such that, for each agent X,
IPo(X) consists of the private key of X and the public keys of all agents.
For now, no agent is corrupt, so also spy does not possess any private keys
other than his own.
For a user X there are two actions that can be performed at any time
• X can initiate sending a fresh message n to another user Y by building
an onion and sending it to the routerM : (X →M : {|n0, Y, {|n|}Y |}M ),
with n0 fresh;
• or X may also send random messages to the router M , padding the
network with dummy messages. These messages will be ignored by
the router; they only serve to obscure the relation between incoming
and outgoing messages if not enough real traffic is available: (X →
M : {|n|}M ).
The router M will wait until he has received k messages, namely: l
onions of the form (Xi →M : {|ni, Yi,mi|}M ) and k− l padding messages of
the form (Xj → M : {|nj |}M ) with i = 1 . . . l, j = l + 1 . . . k and Xi, Xj , Yi
pairwise distinct. Then it “peels” the onions and forwards the messages to
the intended recipients in random order: (M → Yi : mi) with i = 1 . . . l.
Note that l is a free variable and can be instantiated by any value 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
whereas k is a constant.
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Figure 3.1: Onion Routing
Next, we investigate under what conditions onion routing ensures
unlinkability, that is, which runs r of onion routing make the formula
¬¤spyϕ0(A,B) ∧
∧
X∈AS ♦spyϕ0(X,B) true. Remember that we abbrevi-
ate the formula ∃n. (X Sends n ∧ Y Possesses n) to ϕ0(X,Y ).
Example 3.5.3. Consider a run r in which a user A is sending a message
to a user B via the router M . Intuitively, unlinkability of A and B is
ensured by showing that there is another run r′ that looks similar to r
(i.e., is observationally equivalent to r), but in which another user A′ is
actually communicating with B (and A is communicating with someone
else, B′). This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.1. There ((◦)) represents a
two-layered onion {|n0, B, {|n|}B|}M . When peeled the resulting one-layered
onion is denoted by (◦). ((•)) is a two-layered onion with another nonce in
its core.
The following theorem gives a sufficient condition for a run of Onion Rout-
ing to provide unlinkability. It says that if there are enough messages in
the network, then A and B cannot be linked.
Theorem 3.5.4. Let r be a run of Onion Routing which contains events
e = (A→M : {|n0, B, {|n|}B|}M ) , e′ = (M → B : {|n|}B)
in this order. Then, there exist an anonymity set AS such that r |=
¬¤spyϕ0(A,B) ∧
∧
X∈AS ♦spyϕ0(X,B), with |AS| ≥ k. Recall that k is the
size of the router’s queue.
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Proof. We first prove the left hand side of the conjunction. That is, we
want to prove that r |= ¬¤spyϕ0(A,B). This means that there should be
a run r′ with r′ ∼=spy r such that r′ |= ¬ϕ0(A,B). Let e1 . . . eq be all the
messages in r originated by A which have B as final destination, i.e., each
ei has the form ei = (A→M : mi) where mi = {|nˆi, B, {|ni|}B|}M . To keep
the notation easy, we only consider the case where q = 1; the general case
goes analogously.
By the protocol description of the router, r contains k events e′j =
(Xj →M : {|mj |}M ), j = 1 . . . k, one of which is e1. These are the messages
that the router M received in the same batch as e1. Choose one of the
events e′j that is different from e1 and define a reinterpretation pi such that
pi(m′j) = m1, pi(m1) = m′j , extending it in a natural way to the rest of
the domain. Now r′ = pi(r) is a run of the protocol (because the router
processes messages in batches). Moreover, by the protocol description of
the router, the final destinations of e′j , j = 1 . . . k are pairwise distinct and
therefore B 6¹ pi(mi). This implies r′ 6|= ϕ0(A,B).
Now we are going to prove the right side of the conjunction. Given that
e′ is in r, by the protocol description, there must be k events ei = (Xi →
M : mi) with i = 1 . . . k in r. Moreover, one of these events must be e, say
ej . Take AS = {Xi | i = 1 . . . k}. Note that |AS| = k, since the Xi are all
distinct. To show the r |= ∧X∈AS ♦spyϕ0(X,B) part it suffices to show that
for a fixed Xi, there is a run r′ = pi(r) such that r′ |= ϕ0(Xi, B). Now take
pi such that pi(mi) = mj , pi(mj) = mi, and the obvious extension to the rest
of the domain. As before, r′ is a run of the protocol and r′ |= ϕ0(Xi, B).
Finally, let us consider the case where the private key of the router is com-
promised, i.e., IPo(spy) now contains k−1M . In this case it is easy to see that
unlinkability always fails.
Theorem 3.5.5. For any run r run of Onion Routing which contains the
events
e1 = (A→M : {|n0, B, {|n|}B|}M ) , e2 = (M → B : {|n|}B)
in this order, unlinkability fails. That is, r |= ¤spyϕ0(A,B).
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Proof. Let r′ be a run such that r′ ∼=spy r. Say pi is a reinterpreta-
tion for spy such that pi(r) = r′. Since k−1M ∈ IPo(spy), we have that
pi({|n0, B, {|n|}B|}M ) = {|n0, B, pi({|n|}B)|}M . Because r′ is a valid run of
onion routing, pi({|n|}B) = {|n′|}B for some nonce n′. Then r′ |= A Sends n′
∧B Possesses n′, and therefore r′ |= ϕ0(A,B).
3.5.3 Onion Routing with subtle flaw
We now propose a version of Onion Routing that has a subtle error, and
then show that unlinkability fails while considering a global eavesdropper.
As far as we are aware, this is the first framework that detects this kind of
subtle flaws.
Imagine a modified version of Onion Routing where each channel in
each path is assigned a nonce as an identifier (maybe for establishing a
bi-directional communication). These nonces are reused every time that a
message is sent through this channel.
The following 〈e0, e1, . . . , e7〉 is an example of a run:
e0 = (A→M : 〈n11, ((n))〉) e4 = (A→M : 〈n11, ((n′′))〉)
e1 = (B →M : 〈n21, ((n′))〉) e5 = (B →M : 〈n31, ((n′′′))〉)
e2 = (M → C : 〈n12, (n)〉) e6 = (M → C : 〈n12, (n′′)〉)
e3 = (M → C : 〈n22, (n′)〉) e7 = (M → E : 〈n32, (n′′′)〉)
where ((−)) or (−) denotes an onion like in Section 3.5.2, whose ultimate
destination is clear from the way it is relayed. In e2, M generates a nonce
(an identifier) n12 and remembers the correspondence between n11 and n12.
WhenM relays another onion which comes with the same identifier n11 (in
e4), it includes the corresponding nonce n12 (in e6). B uses a new identifier
n31 in e5 because the destination of the onion is different from e1. From
C’s point of view, since the nonces n and n′′ come with the same identifier
n12, they are from the same originator. Nevertheless the actual originator
A is disguised to C.
Notice that in presence of a global eavesdropper, both runs 〈e0, . . . , e3〉
and 〈e4, . . . , e7〉 ensure unlinkability in themselves. However, when com-
bined, in the run 〈e0, . . . , e7〉 the users A and C are linkable, but only
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because the combination of identifiers n11 and n12 occurs twice in the run.
In the following we put this flaw formally. The candidate runs for
Flawed Onion Routing should be clear from the above example. A user
can originate an onion with an identifier, and the router M relays a peeled
onion with a suitable identifier. The identifiers are either freshly generated
or reused in the way illustrated in the above example. Again we have users
A,B,C, . . . and a router M which are not corrupted. For simplicity we
omit the part where the router sends messages in batches. The protocol
description is given by the following rules.
For every user X there are three things he can do
• He can initiate sending a message through the router (X → M :
〈nX , {|n0, Y, {|n|}Y |}M 〉) where nX , n0 and n are fresh nonces and X 6=
Y .
• after such a message, X can now send followup messages by repeating
the nonce nX : (X →M : 〈nX , {|n′0, Y, {|n′|}Y |}M 〉) where n0 and n are
fresh nonces.
• X is still allowed to send padding messages (X → M : 〈n1, {|n2|}M 〉)
where n1, n2 are fresh nonces.
The router M forwards messages, choosing an outgoing nonce nM corre-
sponding to an incoming nonce nX . This is, when a message (X → M :
〈nX , {|n0, Y,m|}M 〉) is received (again with n0,m fresh and X 6= Y ), it
sends a message (M → Y : 〈nM ,m〉). The first time that M receives nX ,
M picks a fresh random nonce nM and remember this correspondence for
future messages. In general, to attain unlinkability from A to B, there
must be another fixed user C who immediately imitates the behavior of
A: if A sends an onion bound for B, before the onion is relayed, C must
send an onion bound for fixed a D. This condition is fairly unrealistic.
The following theorem formally put this (unrealistic) necessary condition
for unlinkability, for the case where A sends two onions.
Theorem 3.5.6. Let r be a run of Flawed Onion Routing which contains
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the events
e1 = (A→M : 〈nA, {|n0, B, {|n|}B|}M 〉),
e2 = (M → B : 〈nM , {|n|}B〉),
e3 = (A→M : 〈nA, {|n′0, B, {|n′|}B|}M 〉),
e4 = (M → B : 〈nM , {|n′|}B〉)
in this order. If r |= ¬¤spyϕ0(A,B) then, r contains before e2 and e4,
events (X → M : 〈nX ,m1〉) and (X → M : 〈nX ,m2〉) respectively, for
some user X 6= A, messages m1,m2.
Proof. Suppose we have a run r such that
r |= ¬¤spyϕ0(A,B),
which means that there is a run r′ such that r′ ∼=spy r and r′ |= ¬ϕ0(A,B).
Let pi be a reinterpretation for spy such that pi(r) = r′. By Definition 3.3.6,
r′ must contain events e′2 = pi(e2) = (M → B : 〈nM , pi({|n|}B)〉) and e′4 =
pi(e4) = (M → B : 〈nM , pi({|n′|}B)〉). Therefore, by the protocol description
as to correspondence of identifiers, r′ must contain events e′1 and e′3 of
the form e′1 = (X → M : 〈nX , pi({|n0, B, {|n|}B|}M )〉) and e′3 = (X →
M : 〈nX , pi({|n′0, B, {|n′|}B|}M )〉), for some common sender X. Now r′ |=
¬ϕ0(A,B) implies X 6= A, which finishes the proof.
The theorem shows that, in order to provide unlinkability, there must be
another user in the system that sends repeated nonces to M , with exactly
the same pattern as A. This assumption is fairly unrealistic.
3.6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a framework for verifying a variety of information hiding
properties, using modal logic. This framework provides a well defined epis-
temic language where various competing information hiding properties can
be expressed and verified uniformly at semantical level. Our fine-grained
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definition of message reinterpretation captures subtleties that would not be
captured in other state of the art frameworks.
Several extensions of our framework still remain. An obvious one is the
consideration of a stronger adversarial model (e.g., active corrupt agents,
Dolev-Yao), which should arise straightforwardly. It would also be inter-
esting to consider applications to other fields like secure multiparty com-
putation, and to other security properties besides information hiding, such
as secrecy. From a practical perspective, proofs are slightly complicated,
even with small examples. Therefore, having a tool which can perform
this proofs in an automatic or semi-automatic fashion, would significantly
improve the usability of the framework.
Chapter 4
From Formal to
Computational Proofs of
Protocols using Hashes
4.1 Introduction
The analysis of security protocols is being carried out mainly by means of
two different techniques. On the one hand, there is the logic approach,
which sees messages as algebraic objects defined using some formal lan-
guage. In this view, cryptographic operations are symbolic operations
which are unbreakable. Attackers are typically modeled as so-called Dolev-
Yao attackers [DY83], having total control over the network, having no
computational limitations, and being only (but absolutely) incapable of
breaking cryptographic operations. This view is appealing, because it is
relatively easy to use and captures most mistakes commonly made in secu-
rity protocols.
On the other hand, there is the complexity-based approach. Here
messages are bitstrings and cryptographic operations are functions on bit
strings satisfying certain security properties [Yao82, GM84b, Gol01]. Com-
mon security notions like secrecy, authenticity, and integrity are formulated
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in terms of the probability that someone can mount a successful attack. An
attacker here is a resource bounded probabilistic algorithm, limited by run-
ning time and/or memory. The complexity based methods are more general
and more realistic, but also more complex to use.
In the last few years much research has been done to relate these two
perspectives [AR02, AJ01, MW04a, MW04b, Her05]. Such a relation takes
the form of a function mapping symbolic messagesm to (distributions over)
bitstrings [[m]]. This map then should relate messages that are observation-
ally equivalent in the symbolic world (meaning that a Dolev-Yao attacker
can see no difference between them) to indistinguishable distributions over
bitstrings (meaning that a computationally bounded adversary can only
with negligible probability distinguish the distributions). Such a map al-
lows one to use formal methods, possibly even automated, to reason about
security properties of protocols and have those reasonings be valid also in
the computational world.
The work carried out in the literature on relating these two perspectives
mainly deals with symmetric encryption [AR02, MW04a] and public key en-
cryption [Her05]. Micciancio and Warinschi [MW04a] briefly but explicitly
question if this logical approach can be extended to, among other things,
collision resistant hashes. Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner [BPW06] show
that in their universal composability framework [PW00] a sound interpre-
tation of hashes cannot exist, but that it is possible to give a sound inter-
pretation of formal hashes in the universal composability framework using
random oracles. Similar results, also in the random oracle model, have been
recently shown by Cortier et al. [CKKW06]. Random oracles are often used
in the literature to model hash functions, although they are also often crit-
icized for being unsound in the standard model; there exist examples of
protocols that are secure in the random oracle model but provably insecure
for every possible instantiation with a real function [CGH04].
The problem with hashes is that in the symbolic world h(m) and h(m′)
are indistinguishable for a Dolev-Yao attacker if the attacker does not know
m or m′. In the computational world, however, the normal security defi-
nition — it must be computationally infeasible to compute any pre-image
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of a hash value or a hash collision [RS04] — does not guarantee that the
hash function hides all partial information about the message; hence there
is no guarantee that their interpretation as bitstrings [[h(m)]] and [[h(m′)]]
are computationally indistinguishable.
A possible solution to this can be found in the work of Canetti and
others [Can97a, CMR98] on perfectly one-way functions (a.k.a. oracle hash-
ing). These are computable probabilistic hash functions that hide all partial
information of their input (see Section 4.3.3 for the definition and an ex-
ample).
Our contribution. We propose an extension to the commonly used
Abadi-Rogaway logic of symbolic messages introducing a probabilistic hash
operator hr(m) in the logic, next to the probabilistic symmetric encryption
operator {|m|}rk. Just as the original logic introduces a ¤-operator to put
in place of undecryptable ciphertext (for us ¤r, since we also deal with
repetitions of ciphertexts), we introduce a £r-operator to put in place of
the hash of an unknown message. In the computational world, we interpret
h as a perfectly one-way function H. We prove that if the encryption al-
gorithm E is type-0 secure, the resulting interpretation is sound, extending
the result from [AR02]. The same result holds if E is IND-CPA. The case of
hashes is of particular interest as the gap between the intuitive concept of a
hash function and the computational security assumptions is larger. More-
over, the fact that there is no secret information for the adversary besides
the pre-image itself, makes the soundness proof more involved. This result
previously appeared, in abbreviated form, as [GvR06b]. Furthermore, as-
suming that the encryption scheme is confusion-free (i.e., that it is possible
to detect decryption failure), we prove that the interpretation is complete
as well, extending the result from [MW04a].
For these results, the adversaries under consideration are passive: they
do not try to actively modify messages or insert messages into the network.
We show that although an oracle hash scheme allows us to port security
results from the Dolev-Yao setting to the computational setting with respect
to passive adversaries, it does not do so with respect to active adversaries.
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The reason is the same as for type-0 or IND-CPA encryption schemes:
malleability, i.e., in such an encryption scheme it might be possible for an
attacker to modify an encryption E(κ, µ) of µ to the encryption E(κ, f(µ)) of
another message that has some relation to µ; similarly, for a hash function
or even an oracle hash scheme it might be possible for an attacker to modify
the hash of an unknown message µ to the hash of another unknown message
that has some relation to µ. Concretely, we construct an explicit oracle hash
scheme in which an adversary can create the hash value H(µ′µ) given only
H(µ) and µ′. We stress that passive adversaries are the best that one can
hope for as the standard security definitions for hash functions or even hash
schemes are not resilient against active adversaries.
Overview. Section 4.2 introduces the message algebra, including the
probabilistic encryption and probabilistic hash operators. It also defines
the observational equivalence relation on messages. Section 4.3 then intro-
duces the computational world, giving the security definitions for encryp-
tion and hashes. In Section 4.4 the semantic interpretation [[−]] is defined
and Section 4.5 proves the soundness of this interpretation and Section 4.6
completeness. Section 4.7 discusses the limitation to passive adversaries.
Finally, Section 4.8 has some concluding remarks.
4.2 The Symbolic Setting
This section describes the message space and the observational equivalence
extending the well-known Abadi-Rogaway logic [AR02] of symbolic mes-
sages with hashes. These messages are used to describe cryptographic pro-
tocols and the observational equivalence tells whether or not two protocol
runs are indistinguishable for a global eavesdropper. Here a protocol run is
simply the concatenation of all the messages exchanged in the run. In case
that the initial possessions of the adversary need to be modeled, they can
be concatenated say at the beginning of the message. Note that this man-
ner of modeling protocols is slightly different from the one in the previous
chapter. We opt for this model here as it is more convenient at this level
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of abstraction.
Definition 4.2.1. Key is an infinite set of key symbols, Nonce an infinite
set of nonce symbols, Const a finite set of constant symbols, and Random
an infinite set of randomness labels. Keys are denoted by k, k′, . . . , nonces
by n, n′, . . . , constants by c, c′, . . . , and randomness labels by r, r′, . . . .
There is one special key called k¤ and for every randomness label r there
is a special nonce called nr£. Using these building blocks, messages are
constructed using symbolic encryption, hashing, and pairing operations:
Msg 3 m := c | k | n | {|m|}rk | hr(m) | 〈m,m〉 | ¤r | £r .
Here k and n do not range over all keys/nonces, but only over the non-
special ones. Special symbols ( ¤r and £r) are used to indicate undecrypt-
able ciphertexts or hash values of unknown messages. When interpreting
messages as (ensembles of distributions over) bitstrings, we will treat ¤r as
if it were {|0|}rk¤ and £r as if it were hr(nr£).
A message of the form {|m|}rk is called an encryption and the set of all
such messages is denoted by Enc. Similarly, messages of the form hr(m)
are called hash values and the set of all these messages is denoted byHash.
Finally Box denotes the set of all messages of the form ¤r or £r. The set
of all messages that involve a “random choice” at their “top level”, i.e.,
Key ∪Nonce ∪ Enc ∪Hash ∪ Box, is denoted by RndMsg. The ran-
domness labels model the fact that our computational encryption scheme is
probabilistic: 〈{|m|}rk, {|m|}rk〉 models a repetition (forwarding) of the same
ciphertext, whereas 〈{|m|}rk, {|m|}r
′
k 〉 models a re-encryption with the same
key. Note that our computational hash scheme, oracle hashing, is also
probabilistic; hence, also the symbolic hash function is equipped with ran-
domness labels. In the computational setting there is a verification function
that tells whether or not a certain hash value corresponds to a certain mes-
sage.
For the sake of readability we omit angle brackets inside encryptions
and hashes and anywhere else when redundant.
The closure of a set U of messages is the set of all messages that can be
constructed from U using tupling, detupling, and decryption. It represents
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the information an adversary could deduce knowing U . Note that, due to
the (perfect) one-wayness of a hash function, knowing hr(m) does not pro-
vide an adversary with any information about m. Similarly, modeling the
randomization of the encryption and hash schemes, building new encryp-
tions or hash values does not give any useful information to the adversary.
Definition 4.2.2 (Closure). Let U be a set of messages. The closure of U ,
denoted by U , is the smallest set of messages satisfying:
1. Const ⊆ U ;
2. U ⊆ U ;
3. m,m′ ∈ U =⇒ 〈m,m′〉 ∈ U ;
4. {|m|}rk, k ∈ U =⇒ m ∈ U ;
5. 〈m,m′〉 ∈ U =⇒ m,m′ ∈ U .
For the singleton set {m}, we write m instead of {m}.
The function pattern : Msg → Msg is a straightforward extension of
the same function in Abadi-Rogaway [AR02] which takes a message m
and reduces it to a pattern. Intuitively, pattern(m) is the pattern that
an attacker sees in a message m and messages with the same pattern (up
to renaming) look the same to her. Encryptions with keys the attacker
cannot learn (i.e., not in m) are replaced by ¤ and hash values of unknown
messages by £. Since we allow repetition of ciphertexts and hash values,
we have to distinguish between unknown, but equal, ciphertexts 〈¤r,¤r〉
and unknown, but distinct, ciphertexts 〈¤r,¤r′〉 and likewise for hashes.
Definition 4.2.3. The function pattern : Msg→Msg is defined by
pattern(m) = pattern(m,m)
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where
pattern(〈m1,m2〉, U) = 〈pattern(m1, U), pattern(m2, U)〉
pattern({|m|}rk, U) =
{ {|pattern(m,U)|}rk, if k ∈ U ;
¤R({|m|}rk), otherwise.
pattern(hr(m), U) =
{
hr(pattern(m,U)), if m ∈ U ;
£R(hr(m)), otherwise.
pattern(m,U) = m in any other case.
Here R : Enc ∪ Hash ↪→ Random is an injective function that takes an
encryption or a hash value and outputs a tag that identifies its randomness.
The tagging function R is needed to make sure that the function pattern
is injective: distinct undecryptable messages should be replaced by distinct
boxes and similarly for hashes. Note that instead of using R one could also
tacitly assume that randomness labels r used in distinct contexts, such as
{|m|}rk and {|m′|}r
′
k with m 6= m′, are always distinct.
Example 4.2.4. Consider the message
m = 〈{|{|1|}r′k′ , hr˜(n)|}rk, hrˆ(k), k〉.
pattern(m) = 〈{| ¤s , £t |}rk, hrˆ(k), k〉, because k′, n are not in m,
Then
where t = R(hr˜(n)) and s = R({|1|}r′k′).
Definition 4.2.5 (Renaming). Two messages m and m′ are said to be
equivalent up to renaming, notation m ≈ m′, if there is a type preserving
permutation σ of Key ∪ Nonce ∪ Box ∪ Random such that m = m′σ.
Here m′σ denotes simultaneous substitution of x by σ(x) in m′, for all
x ∈ Key ∪Nonce ∪Box ∪Random.
Definition 4.2.6 (Observational equivalence). Two messages m and m′
are said to be observationally equivalent, denoted by m ∼= m′, if pattern(m)
≈ pattern(m′).
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In the computational world, security definitions for encryption schemes
do not guarantee security when encryption cycles occur. In the symbolic
world, however, this poses no problem. Therefore, as in the original setting
in [AR02], for the mapping from the symbolic world to the computational
world to be sound, we have to forbid encryption cycles in the symbolic
world.
Definition 4.2.7 (Sub-message). 1. m1 ¹ 〈m1,m2〉
2. m2 ¹ 〈m1,m2〉
3. m ¹ {|m|}rk
4. m ¹ hr(m) .
Definition 4.2.8 (Acyclicity). Letm be a message and k, k′ two keys. The
key k is said to encrypt k′ in m if m has a sub-message of the form {|m′|}rk
with k′ being a sub-message of m′. A message is said to be acyclic if there
is no sequence k1, k2, . . . , kn, kn+1 = k1 of keys such that ki encrypts ki+1
in m for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
4.3 The Computational Setting
This section gives a brief overview of some of the concepts used in the com-
plexity theoretic approach to security protocols. Much of this is standard;
the reader is referred to [GB01, BDJR97] for a thorough treatment of the
basic concepts, to [AR02] for the notion of type-0 security for cryptographic
schemes (see Section 4.3.2 below), and to [Can97a] for the notion of oracle
hashing (see Section 4.3.3 below).
In the computational world, messages are elements of Str := {0, 1}∗.
Cryptographic algorithms and adversaries are probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms. When analyzing cryptographic primitives, it is customary to
consider probabilistic algorithms that take an element in Param := {1}∗
as input, whose length scales with the security parameter. By making the
security parameter large enough, the system should become arbitrarily hard
to break.
4.3. The Computational Setting 69
This idea is formalized in the security notions of the cryptographic op-
erations. The basic one, which is what is used to define the notion of
semantically equivalent messages, is that of computational indistinguisha-
bility of probability ensembles over Str. Here a probability ensemble over
Str is a sequence {Aη}η∈N of probability distributions over Str indexed by
the security parameter.
Definition 4.3.1 (Computational indistinguishability). Two probability
ensembles {Xη}η∈N and {Yη}η∈N are computationally indistinguishable, no-
tation {Xη}η∈N ≡ {Yη}η∈N, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithm D,
P[x← Xη;D(1η, x) = 1]− P[x← Yη;D(1η, x) = 1]
is a negligible function of η.
Recall that a function f : N → N is called negligible if for all positive
polynomials p, f(η) ≤ 1p(η) for large enough η. After a brief interlude
on probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms in Section 4.3.1, we give the
formal definition of an encryption scheme and its security notion in Sec-
tion 4.3.2 and of oracle hashing in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Probabilistic Algorithms
In Definition 4.3.1, the notion of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
was already used. Because we explicitly use two different views of these
algorithms and in order to fix notation, we give a more precise definition.
Definition 4.3.2. Coins is the set {0, 1}ω, the set of all infinite sequences
of 0’s and 1’s. We equip Coins with the probability distribution obtained
by flipping a fair coin for each element in the sequence.
Definition 4.3.3. The result of running a probabilistic algorithm A on an
input x ∈ Str is a probability distribution A(x) over Str. When we need
to explicitly write the randomness used while running A, we write A(x, ρ)
with ρ ∈ Coins. Using this notation, P[A(x) = y] = P[ρ← Coins;A(x, ρ) =
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y]. When confusion is unlikely, we will also denote the support of this
probability distribution, {y ∈ Str | P[ρ ← Coins;A(x, ρ) = y)] > 0}, by
A(x).
Now suppose that A runs in polynomial time p. Then running A on
x cannot use more than p(|x|) coin flips. Letting Coinsp(|x|) denote the
uniform probability distribution on {0, 1}p(|x|), we can also write P[A(x) =
y] = P[ρ← Coinsp(|x|);A(x, ρ) = y].
Definition 4.3.4. A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm P : Dom(P )→
{0, 1} is called a probabilistic polynomial time predicate.
4.3.2 Encryption Scheme
For each security parameter η ∈ N we let Plaintextη ⊆ Str be a non-
empty set of plaintexts, satisfying that for each η ∈ N : Plaintextη ⊆
Plaintextη+1 as in Goldwasser and Bellare [GB01]. Let us definePlaintext
=
⋃
η Plaintextη. There is a set Keys ⊆ Str of keys and also a set
Ciphertext ⊆ Str of ciphertexts. Furthermore, there is a special bitstring
⊥ not appearing in Plaintext or Ciphertext. An encryption scheme Π
consists of three algorithms:
1. a (probabilistic) key generation algorithm K : Param → Keys that
outputs, given a unary sequence of length η, a randomly chosen ele-
ment of Keys;
2. a (probabilistic) encryption algorithm E : Keys×Str→ Ciphertext∪
{⊥} that outputs, given a key and a bitstring, an element from
Ciphertext or ⊥;
3. a (deterministic) decryption algorithmD : Keys×Str→ Plaintext∪
{⊥} that outputs, given a key and a ciphertext, an element from
Plaintext or ⊥.
These algorithms must satisfy that the decryption (with the correct key)
of a ciphertext returns the original plaintext. The element ⊥ is used to
indicate failure of en- or decryption, although, beforehand, there is no re-
quirement that decrypting with the wrong keys yields ⊥. Now we define
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type-0 security of an encryption scheme as in [AR02], which is a variant
of the standard semantic security definition, enhanced with some extra
properties. In particular a type-0 secure encryption scheme is which-key
concealing, repetition concealing and length hiding. We refer to the origi-
nal paper for motivation and explanations on how to achieve such an en-
cryption scheme. The notion of type-0 security makes slightly unrealistic
assumptions on the encryption scheme. However our result on hashes does
not significantly depend on the specific security notion for the encryption
scheme. As in [MP05, Her05], it is possible to replace type-0 security by
the standard notion of IND-CPA or IND-CCA by adapting the definition of
pattern. For simplicity of the exposition, throughout this chapter we adopt
the former security notion.
Definition 4.3.5. An adversary (for type-0 security) is a probabilistic po-
lynomial-time algorithm AF(−),G(−) : Param→ {0, 1} having access to two
probabilistic oracles F ,G : Str→ Str. The advantage of such an adversary
is the function AdvA : N→ R defined by
AdvA(η) = P[κ, κ′ ← K(1η);AE(κ,−),E(κ′,−)(1η) = 1]−
P[κ← K(1η);AE(κ,0),E(κ,0)(1η) = 1].
Here the probabilities are taken over the choice of κ and κ′ by the key
generation algorithm K, over the internal coins used by the oracles, and over
the internal choices of A. An encryption scheme 〈K, E ,D〉 is called type-
0 secure if for all polynomial-time adversaries A as above, the advantage
AdvA is a negligible function of η.
In the sequel we need an extra assumption on the encryption scheme,
namely that the ciphertexts are well-spread as a function of the coins tosses
of E . It means that for all plaintexts µ and all keys κ, no ciphertext is
exceptionally likely to occur as the encryption of µ under κ. Note that
this does not follow from, nor implies type-0 security. Also note that every
encryption scheme running in cipher block chaining mode automatically
has this property: the initial vector provides the required randomness.
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Definition 4.3.6 (Well-spread). An encryption scheme 〈K, E ,D〉 is said to
be well-spread if
sup
x∈Ciphertext,κ∈K(1η),µ∈Plaintextη
P[E(κ, µ) = x]
is a negligible function of η.
For completeness it is needed that the decryption algorithm returns
reject whenever it is called with a key that was not used to encrypt the
message in the first place. The special bitstring ⊥ is used to indicate failure
of decryption. This property is called confusion freeness. See [MW04a],
where the completeness for the original Abadi-Rogaway logic is proven.
Definition 4.3.7 (Confusion freeness). Let Π = 〈K, E ,D〉 be an encryption
scheme indexed by the security parameter η. Π is said to be confusion free
if for all bitstrings µ the probability
P[κ1, κ2 ← K(η) : Dκ1 (Eκ2(µ)) 6= ⊥]
is a negligible function of η.
4.3.3 Oracle Hashing
The underlying secrecy assumptions behind formal or Dolev-Yao hashes
[DY83] are very strong. It is assumed that given a hash value f(x), it is
not possible for an adversary to learn any information about the pre-image
x. In the literature this idealization is often modelled with the random
oracle [BR93]. Such a primitive is not computable and therefore it is also
an idealization. Practical hash functions like SHA or MD5 are very useful
cryptographic primitives but have no proven security guarantees. Moreover,
under the traditional security notions (one-wayness), a function that reveals
half of its input might still be secure. In addition, any deterministic hash
function f leaks partial information about x, namely f(x) itself. Through-
out this chapter we consider a new primitive introduced by Canetti [Can97a]
called oracle hashing, that mimics what semantic security is for encryption
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schemes. This hash function is probabilistic and therefore it needs a verifica-
tion function, just as in a signature scheme. A hash scheme consists of two
algorithms H and V. The probabilistic algorithm H : Param× Str→ Str
takes a unary sequence and a message and outputs a hash value; the veri-
fication algorithm V : Str× Str→ {0, 1} that given two messages x and c
correctly decides whether c is a hash of x or not. As an example we repro-
duce here a hash scheme proposed in the original paper. Let p be a large
(i.e., scaling with η) safe prime. Take H(x) = 〈r2 mod p, r2·f(x) mod p〉,
where r is a randomly chosen element in Z∗p and f is any collision resistant
hash function. The verification algorithm V(x, 〈a, b〉) just checks whether
b = af(x) mod p.
We consider two security notions for such a hash scheme. The first
one, proposed by Canetti [Can97a] and later revisited in [CMR98], oracle
indistinguishability, guarantees that an adversary can gain no information
at all about a bitstring, given its hash value (or rather, with sufficiently
small probability). The second one, more standard, is an appropriate form
of collision resistance. It guarantees that an adversary cannot (or rather,
again, with sufficiently small probability) compute two distinct messages
that successfully pass the verification test with the same hash value.
Definition 4.3.8 (Oracle indistinguishability). A hash scheme 〈H,V〉 is
said to be oracle indistinguishable if for every family of probabilistic polyno-
mial-time predicates {Dη : Str→ {0, 1}}η∈N and every positive polynomial
p there is a polynomial size family {Lη}η∈N of subsets of Str such that for
all large enough η and all x, y ∈ Str \ Lη:
P[Dη(H(1η, x)) = 1]− P[Dη(H(1η, y)) = 1] < 1
p(η)
.
Here the probabilities are taken over the choices made by H and the choices
made by Dη. This definition is the non-uniform [Gol01] version of oracle
indistinguishability proposed by Canetti [Can97a] as it is used in the proofs
in Appendix B of the full version [Can97b].
Definition 4.3.9 (Collision resistance). A hash scheme 〈H,V〉 is said to
be collision resistant if for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary
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A, the probability
P[〈c, x, y〉 ← A(1η);x 6= y ∧ V(x, c) = V(y, c) = 1]
is a negligible function of η.
4.4 Interpretation
Section 4.2 describes a setting where messages are symbolic terms gener-
ated by some grammar. In Section 4.3 messages are bitstrings and oper-
ations are given by probabilistic algorithms operating on bitstrings. This
section shows how to map symbolic messages to (distributions over) bit-
strings. This interpretation is very much standard. We refer to [AR02,
AJ01, MW04a] for a thorough explanation. In particular this section intro-
duces notation that allows us to assign, beforehand, some of the random
coin flips used for the computation of the interpretation of a message. This
notation becomes useful throughout the soundness proof.
Tagged representation. Throughout this chapter we assume that it is
always possible to recover the type information of a message from its bit-
string representation. This can be easily achieved by adding the necessary
type tags to the bitstring representation. We will abstract from this repre-
sentation by overloading the notation. We use Greek letters for bitstrings
and µ represents a bitstring of a generic type. We write µ1µ2 for a pair
of bitstrings (in [AR02] this would be written as 〈(µ1, µ2), “pair”〉); ² for
a ciphertext; κ for a key; ψ for a hash value; ν for a nonce and ς for a
constant.
Definition 4.4.1. For every message m we define the set R(m) ⊆Msg of
random messages in m as follows:
R(c) = ∅ R({|m|}rk) = R(m) ∪ {k, {|m|}rk}
R(n) = {n} R(hr(m)) = R(m) ∪ {hr(m)}
R(k) = {k} R(〈m1,m2〉) = R(m1) ∪ R(m2)
R(¤r) = {k¤,¤r} R(£r) = {nr£,£r}.
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Note that R(m) is nearly equal to the set of all sub-messages of m
that are in RndMsg (defined in Section 4.2); the only difference is that
R(m) also may contain the special key k¤ or special nonces nr£. When
interpreting a message m as (ensembles of distributions over) bitstrings
(Definition 4.4.3 below), we will first choose a sequence of coin flips for all
elements of R(m) and use these sequences as source of randomness for the
appropriate interpretation algorithms.
Definition 4.4.2. For every finite subsetX ofRndMsg we define Coins(X)
as {τ | τ : X → Coins}. We equip Coins(X) with the induced product prob-
ability distribution. Furthermore, for every message m we write Coins(m)
instead of Coins(R(m)).
An element of τ of Coins(m) gives, for every sub-message m′ of m that
requires random choices when interpreting this sub-message as a bitstring,
an infinite sequence τ(m′) of coin flips that will be used to resolve the
randomness.
Now we are ready to give semantic to our message algebra. We use E
(as defined in Section 4.3.2) to interpret encryptions, K to interpret key
symbols, and H (as defined in Section 4.3.3) to interpret hashes. We let
C : Const → Str be a function that (deterministically) assigns a constant
bit string to each constant identifier. We let N : Param → Str be the
nonce generation function that, given a unary sequence of length η, chooses
uniformly and randomly a bitstring from {0, 1}η.
Definition 4.4.3. For a message m, a value of the security parameter
η ∈ N, a finite set U of messages containing R(m), and a τ ∈ Coins(U), we
can (deterministically) create a bitstring [[m]]τη ∈ Str as follows:
[[c]]τη = C(c) [[{|m|}rk]]τη = E([[k]]τη , [[m]]τη , τ({|m|}rk))
[[k]]τη = K(1η, τ(k)) [[hr(m)]]τη = H(1η, [[m]]τη , τ(hr(m)))
[[n]]τη = N (1η, τ(n)) [[¤r]]τη = E([[k¤]]τη , C(0), τ(¤r))
[[〈m1,m2〉]]τη = [[m1]]τη [[m2]]τη [[£r]]τη = H(1η, [[nr£]]τη , τ(£r)).
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Note that [[m]]τη = [[m]]
τ |R(m)
η . For a fixed message m and η ∈ N, choos-
ing τ from the probability distribution Coins(R(m)) creates a probability
distribution [[m]]η over Str:
[[m]]η := [τ ← Coins(m); [[m]]τη ].
Note that although the codomain of τ ∈ Coins(m) is Coins, the set of
infinite bitstrings, when interpreting a fixed message m at a fixed value of
the security parameter η, only a predetermined finite initial segment of each
sequence of coin flips will be used by K, N , E , and H (cf. Definition 4.3.3).
In fact, because these four algorithms run in polynomial time, for every
message m there exists a polynomial pm such that every call to one of these
four algorithms uses at most the first pm(η) elements of τ . Now define
Coinsη(m) = {τ | τ : R(m) → {0, 1}pm(η)} and equip this with the uniform
probability distribution. Then we can also write
[[m]]η = [τ ← Coinsη(m); [[m]]τη ].
Furthermore, letting η range over N creates an ensemble of probability
distributions [[m]] over Str, namely [[m]] := {[[m]]η}η∈N.
4.4.1 Partial interpretation
For technical reasons throughout the soundness proof, we need to compute
the interpretation of a symbolic message while part of its randomness has
already been chosen. This section introduces straightforward notation to
do so.
Definition 4.4.4. For every messagem andm′ we define the set R(m,m′) ⊆
RndMsg of random messages in m relative to m′ as follows:
if m = m′, then R(m,m′) = ∅, otherwise
R(c,m′) = ∅ R({|m|}rk,m′) = R(m,m′) ∪ {k, {|m|}rk}
R(n,m′) = {n} R(hr(m),m′) = R(m,m′) ∪ {hr(m)}
R(k,m′) = {k} R(〈m1,m2〉,m′) = R(m1,m′) ∪ R(m2,m′)
R(¤r,m′) = {k¤,¤r} R(£r,m′) = {nr£,£r}.
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Note that R(m,m′) is the set of all random messages in m except those
that only occur as a sub-message of m′.
Example 4.4.5. Let m be the message 〈k, {|0|}rk, hr
′
({|0|}rk, n), n′〉 and let
m˜ be the message inside the hash: 〈{|0|}rk, n〉. Then the randomness in
m is R(m) = {k, {|0|}rk, hr
′
({|0|}rk, n), n′, n}, the randomness inside the hash
is R(m˜) = {{|0|}rk, k, n}, and the randomness that occurs only outside the
hash is R(m,hr
′
(m˜)) = R(m) \ {hr′(m˜), n}. The randomness that is shared
between the inside of the hash and the outside of the hash is R(m,hr
′
(m˜))∩
R(m˜) = {k, {|0|}rk}.
We will need a way of interpreting a message as a bitstring when the
interpretation of certain sub-messages has already been chosen in some
other way.
Definition 4.4.6. Let η ∈ N, let e be a function from Dom(e) ⊆ Msg
to Str and let τ ∈ Coinsη(U \ Dom(e)) with U a finite set of messages
containing R(m). We interpret a message m using e whenever possible.
Otherwise, we use the coin flips assigned by τ to generate an interpretation.
If m ∈ Dom(e), then [[m]]e,τη = e(m), else
[[c]]e,τη = C(c) [[{|m|}rk]]e,τη = E([[k]]τη , [[m]]e,τη , τ({|m|}rk))
[[k]]e,τη = K(1η, τ(k)) [[hr(m)]]e,τη = H(1η, [[m]]e,τη , τ(hr(m)))
[[n]]e,τη = N (1η, τ(n)) [[¤r]]e,τη = E([[k¤]]e,τη , C(0), τ(¤r))
[[〈m1,m2〉]]e,τη = [[m1]]e,τη [[m2]]e,τη [[£r]]e,τη = H(1η, [[nr£]]e,τη , τ(£r)).
We also need a way of pre-specifying some of the random choices to be
made when interpreting a message.
Definition 4.4.7. Let η ∈ N and let τ ∈ Coinsη(U) for some finite set of
messages U . Then for every message m, the distribution [[m]]τη is obtained
by randomly choosing coins for the remaining randomness labels in m.
Formally,
[[m]]τη := [τ
′ ← Coinsη(R(m) \ U); [[m]]τ∪τ
′
η ],
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where τ ∪ τ ′ ∈ Coinsη(m) denotes the function which agrees with τ on
U ∩ R(m) and with τ ′ on R(m) \ U .
This can also be combined with the previous way of preselecting a part
of the interpretation. For a function e from a set Dom(e) ⊆ Msg to Str
and τ ∈ Coinsη(U) as above, we define
[[m]]e,τη := [τ
′ ← Coinsη(R(m) \ U); [[m]]e,τ∪τ
′
η ].
4.5 Soundness
This section shows that the interpretation proposed in the previous section
is computationally sound. Throughout this section we assume that the
encryption scheme 〈K, E ,D〉 is type-0 secure (or IND-CCA with pattern
modified as in [Her05, MP05]) and well-spread, and that the probabilistic
hash scheme 〈H,V〉 is oracle indistinguishable and collision resistant.
In order to isolate our contribution, we split the function pattern in
two parts: one replacing the encryptions and one replacing the hashes.
We define the function encpat as in Abadi-Rogaway [AR02] which takes
a message m and reduces it to a pattern. This function does not replace
hashes.
Definition 4.5.1. The function encpat : Msg→Msg is defined as follows
encpat(m) = encpat(m,m)
where
encpat(〈m1,m2〉, U) = 〈encpat(m1, U), encpat(m2, U)〉
encpat({|m|}rk, U) =
{ {|encpat(m,U)|}rk, if k ∈ U ;
¤R({|m|}rk), otherwise.
encpat(hr(m), U) = hr(encpat(m,U))
encpat(m,U) = m in any other case.
Now we define the function hashpat which takes a message m and re-
duces all hashes of unknown (not in m) sub-messages, to £. This function
does not replace encryptions.
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Definition 4.5.2. Define the function hashpat : Msg→Msg as
hashpat(m) = hashpat(m,m)
where
hashpat(〈m1,m2〉, U) = 〈hashpat(m1, U), hashpat(m2, U)〉
hashpat({|m|}rk, U) = {|hashpat(m,U)|}rk
hashpat(hr(m), U) =
{
hr(hashpat(m,U)), if m ∈ U ;
£R(hr(m)), otherwise.
hashpat(m,U) = m in any other case.
Lemma 4.5.3. pattern ≈ encpat ◦ hashpat.
Proof. A straightforward induction on m shows that m = hashpat(m). Us-
ing this, another straightforward induction on m shows that pattern(m) ≈
encpat(hashpat(m)).
Theorem 4.5.4 (Abadi-Rogaway). Let m be an acyclic message. Suppose
that for every sub-message hr(m˜) of m, m˜ ∈ m. Then [[m]] ≡ [[encpat(m)]].
Proof. The proof follows just like in Abadi-Rogaway [AR02]. Interpreting
hashes here is straightforward because their argument is always known, by
assumption. We refer the reader to the original paper for a full proof.
Before starting the proof of the soundness theorem, we give a sketch for
an easy case and point out where the technical problems in the general case
are. Consider two messages h(n, 0)n′ and h(n, 1)n′. These are observation-
ally equivalent and we have to prove that [[h(n, 0), n′]] and [[h(n, 1), n′]] are
computationally indistinguishable. The way to prove this is standard: we
assume that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that
can distinguish these two ensembles of probability distribution and use it
to build an adversary D that break the oracle indistinguishability of the
hash scheme 〈H,V〉. What D has to do is clear: it receives a hash value
α which is either H(1η, ν0) or H(1η, ν1), and has to guess which one it
is. It generates a nonce ν ′ and calls A on αν′. Since A can successfully
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distinguish H(1η, ν0)ν ′ from H(1η, ν1)ν ′, this enables D to break oracle
indistinguishability.
A problem occurs in the case of the messages h(n, n′)n′ and h(n, 1)n′.
Receiving a hash value α which is either H(1η, νν ′) or H(1η, ν1), D cannot
just generate a nonce ν ′′ and call A on αν ′′: the distribution of H(1η, νν ′)ν ′
is not equal to that of H(1η, νν ′)ν ′′. The technical solution is to provide
the adversary D with access to ν ′; this is enough to prove that oracle
indistinguishability can then be broken. What is still needed is that the
inside of the hash is still “random enough” even if part of it is revealed; in
this particular case this means that revealing ν ′, the inside of that hash is
still hidden to D.
We now first prove, in general, that it is safe to reveal some of the
randomness inside the hash. More accurately, if you pre-specify some, but
not all, of the sequences of coins to be chosen when interpreting a mes-
sage m, then no single bitstring x is exceptionally likely to occur as the
interpretation of m. After this lemma, we can prove the soundness result.
Lemma 4.5.5. Let m be a message, U  R(m). Let p be a positive
polynomial. Then, for large enough η
∀τ ∈ Coinsη(U).∀x ∈ Str : P[α← [[m]]τη ;α = x] <
1
p(η)
.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the structure of m.
• Consider the casem = 〈m1,m2〉. We get by induction hypothesis that
the statement holds either for m1 or m2, which suffices for the proof
given that concatenating a bitstring might just lower the probability
of hitting a particular element.
• The cases m = {|m1|}rk and m = ¤r are trivial due to well-spreadness
(Definition 4.3.6).
• The cases £r and m = hr(m1) follow from collision resistance (Defi-
nition 4.3.9).
• The case m = c does not occur since U must be a proper subset of
R(c) = ∅.
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• If m is a nonce n, then U = ∅ since it must be a proper subset of
R(n) = {n}. Then P[α← [[n]]τη ;α = x] = 12η < 1p(η) .
• If m is a key k, then again U = ∅. Suppose that for infinitely many
η there is a τ ∈ Coinsη(U) and an x ∈ Str for which
P[α← [[k]]τη ;α = x] = P[α← K(1η);α = x] ≥
1
p(η)
. (4.0)
Now we build an adversary AF(−),G(−) : Param→ {0, 1} that breaks
type-0 security.
algorithm AF(−),G(−)(1η) :
ν ← N (1η)
²← F(ν)
κ← K(1η)
if D(κ, ²) = ν return 1
else return 0
This adversary generates a random nonce ν and gives it to the oracle F
to encrypt. The adversary tries to guess if the oracle was instantiated
with E(k,−) or with E(k, 0) by simply randomly generating a key itself and
trying to decrypt. We will show that the probability that the oracle and the
adversary choose the same key is non-negligible and hence the probability
that this adversary guesses correctly is also non-negligible. Omitting G as
it is not used by A, we get
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AdvA(η)
= P[κ← K(1η); ν ← N (1η); ²← E(κ, ν);κ′ ← K(1η);D(κ′, ²) = ν]
− P[κ← K(1η); ν ← N (1η); ²← E(κ, 0);κ′ ← K(1η);D(κ′, ²) = ν]
≥ P[κ, κ′ ← K(1η);κ = κ′]
−
∑
y∈{0,1}η
P[ν ← N (1η); y = ν] · P[κ, κ′ ← K(1η);D(κ′, E(κ, 0)) = y]
(because it is always possible to decrypt with the proper key)
≥ 1
p(η)2
− 2−η
∑
y∈{0,1}η
P[κ, κ′ ← K(1η); ²← E(κ, 0);D(κ′, ²) = y]
(bounding the first term by the probability of getting x two times)
≥ 1
p(η)2
− 2−η
∑
κ0,κ′0,²0
(
P[κ, κ′ ← K(1η);κ = κ0;κ′ = κ′0; E(κ, 0) = ²0]
·
∑
y∈{0,1}η
P[D(κ′0, ²0) = y]
)
≥ 1
p(η)2
− 2−η ≥ 1
p(η)3
(for large enough η).
Theorem 4.5.6. Letm be a message with a sub-message of the form hr(m˜).
Assume that m˜ 6∈ m. Take m′ := m[hr(m˜) := £s], where s = R(hr(m˜)).
Then [[m]] ≡ [[m′]].
Proof. Assume that [[m]] 6≡ [[m′]], say A : Param× Str→ {0, 1} is a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time adversary and p a positive polynomial such that
1
p(η)
≤ P[µ← [[m]]η;A(1η, µ) = 1]− P[µ← [[m′]]η;A(1η, µ) = 1] (4.0)
for infinitely many η ∈ N. We will use this to build a distinguisher as in
Definition 4.3.8 that breaks oracle indistinguishability of 〈H,V〉.
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Let η ∈ N, abbreviate R(m, m˜) ∩ R(m˜) to U and let τ ∈ Coinsη(U).
Note that τ chooses coin flips for the shared randomness between the inside
and the outside of the hash. Then define a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm Dτη : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} as follows.
algorithm Dτη(α) :
µ← [[m]]{hr(m˜) 7→α},τη
β ← A(η, µ)
return β
This algorithm tries to guess if a given bitstring α was drawn from [[hr(m˜)]]τη
or from [[£s]]τη = [[hs(ns£)]]
τ
η
. It does so by computing an interpretation form
as follows. The sub-message hr(m˜) is interpreted as α; the randomness that
is shared between the inside of the hash (m˜) and the rest of the message
is resolved using hard-coded sequences of coin flips τ . It then uses the
adversary A to guess if the resulting interpretation was drawn from [[m]]η
(in which case it guesses that α was drawn from [[hr(m˜)]]η) or from [[m
′]]η
(in which case it guesses that α was drawn from [[£s]]η).
Note that for every η and τ we have a different algorithm Dτη that has
hardcoded coin flips for the shared randomness. However we do not have
a single algorithm taking η and α as arguments since such an algorithm
would need an infinite sequence of hardcoded coin flips.
Now consider one of the infinitely many values of η for which (4.5) holds.
Using Dτη we can rephrase (4.5) as follows:
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1
p(η)
≤ P[τ ← Coinsη(U), α← [[hr(m˜)]]τη ;Dτη(α) = 1]−
P[τ ← Coinsη(U), α← [[£s]]τη ;Dτη(α) = 1]
=
∑
τ∈Coinsη(U)
(
P[α← [[hr(m˜)]]τη ;Dτη(α) = 1]−
P[α← [[£s]]τη ;Dτη(α) = 1]
)
· P[T ← Coinsη(U);T = τ ]
=
∑
τ∈Coinsη(U)
(
P[α← [[m˜]]τη ;Dτη(H(1η, α)) = 1]−
P[α← [[ns£]]τη ;Dτη(H(1η, α)) = 1]
)
· P[T ← Coinsη(U);T = τ ]
=
1
|Coinsη(U)|
∑
τ∈Coinsη(U)
(
P[α← [[m˜]]τη ;Dτη(H(1η, α)) = 1]−
P[α← [[ns£]]τη ;Dτη(H(1η, α)) = 1]
)
.
Note that τ selects the randomness that is shared between the inside of the
hash and the outside of the hash; when α is drawn from [[m˜]]τη the random-
ness that appears only inside the hash is chosen (and the assumption on m˜
means that there is really something to choose); H chooses the randomness
for taking the hash; and Dτη itself resolves the randomness that appears
only outside the hash.
This means that there must be a particular value of τ , say τ¯η, such that
1
p(η)
≤ P[α← [[m˜]]τ¯ηη ;Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1]− P[α← [[ns£]]τ¯ηη ;Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1].
Gathering all Dτ¯ηη together for the various values of η, let D be the
non-uniform adversary {Dτ¯ηη }η∈N. Note that we have not actually defined
D
τ¯η
η for all η, but only for those (infinitely many) for which (4.5) actually
holds. What D does for the other values of η is irrelevant.
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We will now show thatD breaks the oracle indistinguishability of 〈H,V〉.
For this, let L = {Lη}η∈N be a polynomial size family of subsets of Str. We
have to show that for infinitely many values of η, there are x, y ∈ Str \ Lη
such that D meaningfully distinguishes between H(1η, x) and H(1η, y).
Once again, take one of the infinitely many values of η for which (4.5)
holds. Continuing from (4.5), we get
1
p(η)
≤
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α]
−
∑
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
=
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη
[
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
(since
∑
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη
P[[[ns£]]
τ¯η
η = β] = 1 and
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη
P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] = 1)
=
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1]− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1]− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1]− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
(splitting cases on ∈ Lη and 6∈ Lη)
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≤
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη \Lη
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1]− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
(since P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1] ≥ 0)
≤
∑
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
P[[[ns£]]
τ¯η
η = β] +
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1]− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
(since P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] ≤ 1,
∑
α∈[[m]]τ¯ηη
P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] = 1 and
∑
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη \Lη
P[[[ns£]]
τ¯η
η = β] ≤ 1)
≤ 1
2p(η)
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1]− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
.
(by Lemma 4.5.5 (2x) using the polynomial 4p(η)|Lη|, provided that η is large)
Now suppose that for all α ∈ [[m˜]]τ¯ηη \ Lη and all β ∈ [[ns£]]τ¯ηη \ Lη we have
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1]− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1] < 12p(η) .
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Then, continuing from (4.5), we get a contradiction:
1
p(η)
<
1
2p(η)
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη \Lη
1
2p(η)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
=
1
2p(η)
+
1
2p(η)
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns£]]τ¯ηη \Lη
P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns£]]τ¯ηη = β]
≤ 1
2p(η)
+
1
2p(η)
.
Therefore, there must be an α ∈ [[m˜]]τ¯ηη \ Lη and a β ∈ [[ns£]]τ¯ηη \ Lη such
that
1
2p(η)
≤ P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1]− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1].
Hence D breaks oracle indistinguishability, contradicting the assumption
on 〈H,V〉.
Theorem 4.5.7 (Soundness). Let m and m′ be acyclic messages. Then
m ∼= m′ =⇒ [[m]] ≡ [[m′]].
Proof. The assumption that m ∼= m′ means that pattern(m) ≈ pattern(m′).
Therefore we get [[pattern(m)]] = [[pattern(m′)]]. By lemma 4.5.3 we get
[[encpat ◦ hashpat(m)]] = [[encpat ◦ hashpat(m′)]]. Now, by applying Theo-
rem 4.5.4 two times, we obtain [[hashpat(m)]] ≡ [[hashpat(m′)]]. Finally, we
start with m and repeatedly apply Theorem 4.5.6, replacing one hash at a
time by £, and arrive at hashpat(m). This shows that [[m]] ≡ [[hashpat(m)]]
and similarly [[m′]] ≡ [[hashpat(m′)]]. Therefore [[m]] ≡ [[m′]].
4.6 Completeness
Although soundness results allow us to port proofs of secrecy properties
from the symbolic world to the computational world, it does not permit to
port, for instance, authenticity and integrity results. For example, consider
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a protocol in which an agent A chooses a nonce n and commits to this
nonce by sending h(n) to another agent B. Later in the protocol, A will
reveal the nonce n by sending n itself to B. Security in this setting means
that A cannot change her choice after sending h(n). In the symbolic world,
this is guaranteed by the fact that the message h(n)n (the concatenation
of the relevant messages in the protocol run) is observationally distinct
from h(n)n′, with n′ 6= n. We would like to be able to conclude from this
symbolic property that [[h(n)n]] is computationally distinct from [[h(n)n′]],
since that is needed to guarantee the security in the computational world.
What is needed here is completeness: computational equivalence of [[m]]
and [[m′]] should imply observational equivalence ofm andm′. For the origi-
nal Abadi-Rogaway logic, completeness under appropriate conditions on the
encryption scheme was proven by Micciancio and Warinschi [MW04a].
This section now shows that the interpretation proposed in the Sec-
tion 4.4 is complete. Throughout this section we assume that the encryp-
tion scheme 〈K, E ,D〉 is type-0 secure, well-spread, and confusion free, and
that the probabilistic hash scheme 〈H,V〉 is collision resistant and oracle
indistinguishable.
Throughout the completeness proof we follow the steps of Micciancio–
Warinschi and their notation when possible. We recall here some of their
results as they are used in our proof.
In the original Abadi-Rogaway logic, the useful information for an ad-
versary is determined by the set of keys she can learn. We define the func-
tion arecover and its computational counterpart brecover as in [MW04a].
There they are called recoverable and getkeys. These functions extract the
set of keys observable by an adversary from a symbolic message and a
bitstring respectively.
Definition 4.6.1. The function arecover : Msg→ P(Key) is defined by:
arecover(m) = arecover(m, |m|)
where
arecover(m, 0) = ∅
arecover(m, d+ 1) = Fkr(m, arecover(m, d))
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and
Fkr(〈m1,m2〉, U) = Fkr(m1, U) ∪ Fkr(m2, U)
Fkr(k, U) = {k} ∪ U
Fkr({|m|}rk, U) = Fkr(m,U), if k ∈ U ;
Fkr(m,U) = U, in any other case.
The function brecover : Str→ P(Keys) is defined by
algorithm brecover(µ) :
Gets all the keys in the bitstring
µ with high probability.
U ′ := ∅
do
U := U ′
U ′ := Ckr(µ,U)
until U = U ′
return U
where
Ckr(κ,U) = {κ} ∪ U
Ckr(µ1µ2, U) = Ckr(µ1, U) ∪ Ckr(µ2, U)
Ckr(², U) = Ckr(µ,U), if ∃!κ ∈ U s.t. D(², κ) = µ 6= ⊥;
Ckr(µ,U) = U, otherwise.
Note that brecover can be computed in polynomial time: we can assume
without loss of generality that the size of the output of the decryption
algorithm is smaller than the input ciphertext (since the encryption scheme
is randomized). Then Ckr recurses a linear number of times and every
iteration of the until loop of brecover adds at least one key to U ′ and
therefore the number of iterations is bounded by the maximum number of
keys in µ.
The following lemma also from [MW04a] shows the relation between
these two functions.
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Lemma 4.6.2. Let Π = 〈K, E ,D〉 be a confusion free encryption scheme
and let m ∈Msg. Then
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); brecover([[m]]τη) 6= [[arecover(m)]]τη ]
is a negligible function of η.
Proof. We refer the reader to the original paper for a complete proof of this
lemma. The hashes that appear in our logic have no influence at all.
In our extended logic, due to the hashes, it is not true any more that the
only useful information for an adversary is the set of keys. Any message
an adversary can learn might be the pre-image of a certain hash value.
Therefore, we need to be able to compute the closure (up to a certain
size) of a given message or bitstring. For this reason the closure operators
defined below are closed (up to a certain size) under pairing but not under
encryption or hashing.
Definition 4.6.3. The function aclosure : Msg × N → P(Msg) computes
the messages in the symbolic closure of a message, up to a certain size d:
aclosure(m, d) = aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))
where
aclosure(m, d, U) = asynth(aanalz(m,U), d).
Here the function aanalz : Msg×P(Msg)→ P(Msg), defined below, splits
a message in all its meaningful subterms, using the keys in U , when possible,
for decrypting.
aanalz(〈m1,m2〉, U) = aanalz(m1, U) ∪ aanalz(m2, U)
aanalz({|m|}rk, U) = {{|m|}rk} ∪ aanalz(m,U), if k ∈ U ;
aanalz(m,U) = {m}
The function asynth : P(Msg)×N→ P(Msg) generates all possible vectors
of messages in U of size up to d:
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algorithm asynth(U, d) :
U1 = U
for i = 2 to d
Ui := ∅
for each m ∈ U
for each v ∈ Ui−1
Ui := Ui ∪ {〈m, v〉}
return Ud
algorithm bsynth(U, d) :
U1 = U
for i = 2 to d
Ui := ∅
for each µ ∈ U
for each ω ∈ Ui−1
Ui := Ui ∪ {µω}
return Ud
Next, the functions bclosure : Str×N→ P(Str), banalz : Str×P(Str)→
P(Str) and bsynth : P(Str)× N→ P(Str) are the computational counter-
parts of aclosure, aanalz and asynth respectively:
bclosure(µ, d) = bclosure(µ, d, brecover(µ))
where
bclosure(µ, d, U) = bsynth(banalz(µ,U), d)
and
banalz(µ1µ2, U) = banalz(µ1, U) ∪ banalz(µ2, U)
banalz(², U) = {²} ∪ banalz(µ,U), if ∃!κ ∈ Us.t.D(², κ) = µ 6= ⊥;
banalz(µ,U) = {µ}
Note that for a fixed d ∈ N, bclosure(µ, d) can be computed in a time
that is polynomial in |µ|.
Now we show that the proposed functions behave similarly with high prob-
ability.
Lemma 4.6.4. Let m ∈Msg, d ∈ N and T ⊆ Key. Then the probability
P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); bclosure([[m]]τη , d, [[T ]]τη) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, T )]]τη
]
is a negligible function of η.
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Proof. We prove by induction on the structure of m that the probability
P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη , [[T ]]τη) 6= [[aanalz(m,T )]]τη
]
is a negligible function of η. The original statement follows from this, using
that asynth and bsynth have similar behavior.
The only non-trivial case is that of m = {|m1|}rk.
• If k ∈ T , then [[k]]τη ∈ [[T ]]τη . Next
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη , [[T ]]τη) = [[aanalz(m,T )]]τη ]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη , [[T ]]τη) = [[{m} ∪ aanalz(m1, T )]]τη ]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); [[m]]τη ∪ banalz([[m1]]τη , [[T ]]τη) = [[{m} ∪ aanalz(m1, T )]]τη
∧∀κ ∈ [[T \ k]]τη : D([[m]]τη , κ) = ⊥]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m1]]τη , [[T ]]τη) = [[aanalz(m1, T )]]τη
∧∀κ ∈ [[T \ k]]τη : D([[m]]τη , κ) = ⊥]
≥ 1− (P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m1]]τη , [[T ]]τη) 6= [[aanalz(m1, T )]]τη
∨∃κ ∈ [[T \ k]]τη : D([[m]]τη , κ) 6= ⊥])
≥ 1− (P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m1]]τη , [[T ]]τη) 6= [[aanalz(m1, T )]]τη ]
+P[τ ← Coinsη(m);∃κ ∈ [[T \ k]]τη : D([[m]]τη , κ) 6= ⊥])
≥ 1− (ε1(η) +
∑
κ∈[T\k]τη
P[τ ← Coinsη(m);D([[m]]τη , κ) 6= ⊥])
≥ 1− (ε1(η) + ε2(η) · (|T | − 1)) ,
where ε1, ε2 are the negligible functions from the induction hypothesis and
confusion freeness respectively.
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• If k 6∈ T , then [[k]]τη 6∈ [[T ]]τη . Next
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη , [[T ]]τη) = [[aanalz(m,T )]]τη ]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη , [[T ]]τη) = [[{m}]]τη ]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη , [[T ]]τη) = [[{m}]]τη
∧∀κ ∈ [[T ]]τη : D([[m]]τη , κ) = ⊥]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); [[m]]τη = [[{m}]]τη ∧ ∀κ ∈ [[T ]]τη : D([[m]]τη , κ) = ⊥]
= 1− P[τ ← Coinsη(m);∃κ ∈ [[T ]]τη : D([[m]]τη , κ) = ⊥]
≥ 1−
∑
κ∈[T ]τη
P[τ ← Coinsη(m);D([[m]]τη , κ) = ⊥]
≥ 1− ε(η) · |T | ,
where ε is a negligible function due to confusion freeness.
The following is an extended version of the function psp from [MW04a],
which is the computational counterpart of pattern. This function takes a
bitstring as an argument and tries to recover the pattern associated with
it. This means that given as input a sample from [[m]], the function outputs
(a renaming of) pattern(m) with high probability. As in [MW04a] we let f
be an arbitrary (but fixed) injective function that associates an identifier
(i.e., an element of Nonce ∪Key ∪Const) to each bitstring of primitive
type (i.e., ν, κ, ς).
psp(µ1µ2, U) = 〈psp(µ1, U), psp(µ2, U)〉
psp(², U) =
{
{|psp(D(², κ), U)|}R(²)f(κ) , if ∃!κ ∈ U s.t. D(², κ) 6= ⊥;
¤R(²), otherwise.
psp(ψ,U) =
{
hR(ψ)(psp(µ,U)), if ∃!µ ∈ U s.t. V(µ, ψ) = 1;
£R(ψ), otherwise.
psp(µ,U) = f(µ) in any other case.
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Theorem 4.6.5. Let m ∈Msg and let U be a finite subset ofMsg. Then
the probability
P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη , [[U ]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m,U)
]
is a negligible function of η.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the structure of m. We only
show here the case m = hr(m1). For the remaining cases, the proof follows
similarly to the one in the original Micciancio-Warinschi [MW04a] paper
and therefore we refer the reader to it.
• If m1 ∈ U then
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη , [[U ]]τη) ≈ pattern(m,U)]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη , [[U ]]τη) ≈ pattern(m,U)
∧∀µ ∈ [[U \ {m1}]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 0]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m1]]τη , [[U ]]τη) ≈ pattern(m1, U)
∧∀µ ∈ [[U \ {m1}]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 0]
= 1− P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m1]]τη , [[U ]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m1, U)
∨∃µ ∈ [[U \ {m1}]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 1]
≥ 1− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m1]]τη , [[U ]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m1, U)
]
+P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m);∃µ ∈ [[U \ {m1}]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 1
]
≥ 1− ε1(η)− ε2(η) ,
where ε1 is the negligible function from the induction hypothesis and ε2 is
a negligible function from collision resistance, using that an adversary can
compute [[U \ {m1}]]τη .
• If m1 6∈ U then
P[τ ←Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη , [[U ]]τη) ≈ pattern(m,U)]
= P[psp([[m]]τη , [[U ]]
τ
η) ≈ £r] = P[∀µ ∈ [[U ]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 0]
4.6. Completeness 95
therefore
P[τ ←Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη , [[U ]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m,U)]
= P[∃µ ∈ [[U ]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 1] ≤ ε(η) ,
where ε is a negligible function due to collision resistance.
Lemma 4.6.6. Let m ∈Msg and d ∈ N. Then the probability
P [µ← [[m]]; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) 6≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))]
is a negligible function of η.
Proof.
P
[
µ← [[m]]; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) ≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))]
= P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη , bclosure([[m]]τη , d)) ≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))
]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη , bclosure([[m]]τη , d)) ≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))
∧ bclosure([[m]]τη , d) = [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη
]
= P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη , [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη) ≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))
∧ bclosure([[m]]τη , d) = [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη
]
≥ 1− P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη , [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))]
−P[τ ← Coinsη(m); bclosure([[m]]τη , d) 6= [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη]
≥ 1− ε1(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); bclosure([[m]]τη , d, brecover([[m]]τη))
6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
]
(where ε1 is the negligible function due to Theorem 4.6.5)
≥ 1− ε1(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m);
bclosure([[m]]τη , d, brecover([[m]]
τ
η)) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
∨[[arecover(m)]]τη 6= brecover([[m]]τη)
]
≥ 1− ε1(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m);
bclosure([[m]]τη , d, [[arecover(m)]]
τ
η) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
∨[[arecover(m)]]τη 6= brecover([[m]]τη)
]
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≥ 1− ε1(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m);
bclosure([[m]]τη , d, [[arecover(m)]]
τ
η) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
]
−P[τ ← Coinsη(m); [[arecover(m)]]τη 6= brecover([[m]]τη)]
≥ 1− ε1(η)− ε2(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m);
bclosure([[m]]τη , d, [[arecover(m)]]
τ
η) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
]
(where ε2 is the negligible function due to Lemma 4.6.2)
≥ 1− ε1(η)− ε2(η)− ε3(η) ,
where ε3 is the negligible function due to Lemma 4.6.4.
Theorem 4.6.7 (Completeness). Let m1 and m2 be acyclic messages.
Then [[m1]] ≡ [[m2]] =⇒ m1 ∼= m2.
Proof. Let us assume that m1 6∼= m2. Now we show that [[m1]] 6≡ [[m2]] by
building a distinguisher D.
algorithm D(µ) :
d := max(|m1|, |m2|)
if psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) ≈ pattern(m1)
return 1
else
return 0
Next we show that AdvD(η) = |P[µ ← [[m1]]η;D(µ) = 1] − P[µ ← [[m2]]η;
D(µ) = 1]| is not negligible. On the one hand
P[µ← [[m1]]η;D(µ) = 1]
= P[µ← [[m1]]η; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) ≈ pattern(m1)]
= 1− P[µ← [[m1]]η; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) 6≈ pattern(m1)]
≥ 1− ε1(η) ,
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where ε1 is the negligible function from Lemma 4.6.6. Note that pattern(m1)
= pattern(m1, aclosure(m1, |m1|)). On the other hand
P[µ← [[m2]]η;D(µ) = 1]
= P[µ← [[m2]]η; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) ≈ pattern(m1)]
≤ P[µ← [[m2]]η; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) 6≈ pattern(m2)]
≤ ε2(η) ,
where ε2 is the negligible function from Lemma 4.6.6. Therefore, AdvD(η) =
1− ε1(η)− ε2(η), which is not negligible.
4.7 Active adversaries
We now briefly turn our attention to active adversaries. One could view
the passive adversaries we have been considering up to now as being given
the transcript of a protocol run and trying to deduce information from
that. The soundness and completeness results say that the information an
adversary could learn in the computational setting is the same as in the
symbolic one. Active adversaries, however, can also try to inject messages
in the network while the protocol is running. Hence, to obtain a sound-
ness result, every meaningful message that an adversary could send in the
computational world, should also be sendable in the symbolic world. Just
as IND-CPA is not strong enough for encryption schemes for this to hold
— one needs non-malleability [MW04b, Her05, MP05] — oracle hashing is
not strong enough for hashes.
We now show an explicit example of an oracle hash scheme where an
adversary is capable of creating more messages in the computational world
than in the symbolic world.
Let p = 2q + 1 be a large (i.e., with q > 2η) safe prime. Consider the
oracle hash H(x) = 〈r2, r2·f(x) mod p〉 from Section 4.3.3. Assume that f
is homomorphic for arguments up to length 2η, i.e., f(x + y) = f(x)f(y)
mod q when x+y < 2η. For instance, one could take f(x) = gx mod q when
x < 2η and f(x) = h(x) otherwise, assuming that q is also a safe prime,
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g is a generator of the quadratic residues modulo q, and h is a collision
resistant one-way function. For simplicity, ignore the tagged representation
(see Section 4.4) and assume that the representation of the concatenation
of two nonces is just ν ′ν = 2η · ν ′ + ν. Then
H(ν ′ν) = H(2η · ν ′ + ν)
= (r2, r2·f(2
η ·ν′+ν) mod p) (for some r)
= (r2, r2·f(ν
′)2
η
f(ν) mod p) (since r2q = 1 mod p)
= (r2, (r2·f(ν))f(ν
′)2
η
mod p).
Therefore, in the computational world with this particular oracle hash,
an attacker receiving H(ν) = (r2, r2·f(ν)) is capable of producing H(ν ′ν)
for a nonce ν ′ of her own choice. In the symbolic world, however, this is
impossible since hr(n′, n) is not in the closure of {hr(n), n′}.
Next, we show a very simple one-way authentication protocol that, im-
plemented with a malleable oracle hash function, results in a broken imple-
mentation. In this protocol, principal B authenticates to principal A, with
whom he shares a symmetric key kAB. The protocol is the following
1. A→ B : n
2. B → A : h(kAB, n)
Consider a homomorphic implementation H of h, as before. Now suppose
that the attacker sees a protocol run: A sends to B a nonce ν, then B
replies H(κAB, ν). Later, the attacker is able to answer a new challenge
ν ′ by sending H(κAB, ν) · H(ν ′ − ν) to A. This results in a successful
impersonation of B by the attacker.
The conclusion is that oracle hashing is not strong enough to give a
perfect correspondence between the symbolic world and the computational
world when the adversary is active. Just as for encryption schemes, what
would be needed is a concept of non-malleability [DDN91] for hashes.
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4.8 Conclusions
We have proposed an interpretation for formal hashes that is computation-
ally sound and complete in the standard model. Under standard assump-
tions on hashes (pre-image and collision resistance), the symbolic world
does not perfectly match the computational world. However, our results
show that it is still possible to achieve this perfect match, for passive adver-
saries, using Canetti’s oracle hashing. While considering active adversaries,
we have shown that the security definition for oracle hashing is not strong
enough. It would be interesting to extend the notion of non-malleability
for hashes to achieve this perfect match also for active adversaries.

Chapter 5
Extending Computational
Soundness Further: the case
of Non-malleable
Commitments
5.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, two main stream approaches have been developed
for the analysis of security protocols. On the one hand, the cryptographic
approach considers an arbitrary computationally-bound adversary that in-
teracts with honest participants and tries to break a security goal. This
model is satisfactory as it deals with every efficient attacker. On the other
hand, the logic or symbolic approach idealizes the security properties of the
cryptographic primitives, which are axiomatized in a logic. Moreover, the
capabilities of the adversary are also specified by a set of inference rules.
This approach is appealing because there are automated techniques for the
verification of some security properties.
This chapter further relates this two approaches considering commit-
ment schemes in the presence of active adversaries. Recall from the intro-
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duction and the previous chapter that this map relates messages that are
observationally equivalent in the symbolic world to indistinguishable dis-
tributions over bitstrings. Such a map allows one to use formal methods,
possibly even automated, to reason about security properties of protocols
and have those reasonings be valid also in the computational setting.
Several extensions to the original Abadi-Rogaway logic [AR02] have
been proposed in the literature. These extensions deal with public key en-
cryption [MW04b, Her05], key cycles [ABHS05], partial information leak-
age [ABS05], active instead of passive adversaries [MW04b, JLM05], and
more realistic security notions [AW05]. Other extensions add new prim-
itives to the logic such as bilinear pairings [Maz07], modular exponen-
tiation [BLMW07] and hash functions [CKKW06, GvR06b]. There are
also frameworks dealing with generic equational theories [BCK05, ABW06,
KM07]. So far there is no work in the literature, that we are aware of, that
relates these two approaches for commitment schemes.
Commitment schemes are fundamental cryptographic primitives and
are used in protocols like zero-knowledge proofs [GMW91], contract sign-
ing [EGL85], and can be used for bidding protocols. A commitment con-
sists of two phases: the commitment phase where the principals commit
to a message without revealing any information; and the opening phase
where the principals reveal the message and it is possible to verify that this
message corresponds to the value committed to during the commitment
phase. After the commitment phase it should be infeasible to open the
commitment to a different value than the one committed. This property
is called binding. In the context of bidding protocols, non-malleability is
also a desirable property. This means that an adversary cannot modify an
intercepted commitment, say into a commitment to a slightly higher bid.
Our contribution. The first objective of this chapter is to find sufficient
security assumptions to give a sound computational interpretation of com-
mitments schemes in the Dolev-Yao model, under active adversaries. Pur-
suing that objective we propose a new indistinguishability-based security
definition for commitment schemes in the presence of adaptive adversaries.
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Then we give a novel generic construction for a non-malleable commitment
scheme based on one-way trapdoor permutations. This construction is se-
cure with respect to our new definition and has some additional properties
such as being non-interactive, perfectly binding and reusable, which makes
it of independent interest. This new definition allows us to prove sound-
ness of the Dolev-Yao model extended with commitments, following the
directions of Micciancio and Warinschi [MW04b].
Overview. Section 5.3 introduces basic notation and definitions from the
literature. Section 5.4 elaborates on different definitions of non-mallea-
bility for commitment schemes and discusses the relations among them. In
Section 5.5 we propose a new commitment scheme and we give a security
proof. Section 5.2 describes symbolic protocol executions, its computational
counterparts and the map between them and also states the soundness
result. Finally in Section 5.7 there are some concluding remarks.
5.2 Symbolic Protocols
We are going to apply this theory to give sound computational interpre-
tation to symbolic commitments. Recall from the introduction that the
symbolic approach to protocol verification deals with symbolic or algebraic
messages and idealized cryptographic primitives. In this setting the ad-
versary is unbounded in running time and has full control over the com-
munication media but is completely incapable of breaking the underlying
cryptographic primitives.
We now describe the message space and the closure operator. These
messages are used to formally describe cryptographic protocols. The clo-
sure represents the knowledge that can be extracted from a message, and
it is used to define what valid algebraic protocol runs are. Intuitively a
protocol run is valid if every message sent by a principal can be deduced
from its knowledge except maybe for some fresh randomness. Much of this
is standard (see, e.g., [AR02, MW04b, MP05, GvR06b]), except that we
model commitments and decommitments as well as encryption.
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Definition 5.2.1. Let Nonce be an infinite set of nonce symbols, Const
a finite set of constant symbols, Key an infinite set of key symbols, and
Random an infinite set of randomness labels. Nonces are denoted by
n, n′, . . . , constants by c, c′, . . . , keys by k, k′, . . . , and randomness labels by
r, r′, . . . . Using these building blocks, messages are constructed using sym-
bolic encryption, commitments, decommitments, and pairing operations:
Msg 3 m := c | n | {|m|}rk | comr(m) | decr(m) | 〈m,m〉.
A message of the form {|m|}rk is called an encryption and the set of all such
messages is denoted by Enc. Similarly, messages of the form comr(m) are
called commitments and the set of all these messages is denoted by Com.
The messages of the form decr(m) are called decommitments and the set
of all these messages is denoted by Dec. In a protocol run decr(m) is a
valid decommitment of comr
′
(m′) only if m = m′ and r = r′. We say that
elements in Const∪Nonce∪Key are primitive and we denote this set by
Prim. For a public key k we denote its associated private key as k−1.
The closure of a set U of messages is the set of all messages that can be
constructed from U using tupling, detupling, commitment, decommitment,
and encryption and decryption. It represents the information an adversary
could deduce knowing U . Note that, due to secrecy of the commitment
scheme, knowing comr(m) does not provide an adversary with any infor-
mation about m.
Definition 5.2.2 (Closure). Let U be a set of messages. The closure of U ,
denoted by U , is the smallest set of messages satisfying:
1. Const ⊆ U ;
2. U ⊆ U ;
3. m,m′ ∈ U =⇒ 〈m,m′〉 ∈ U ;
4. m ∈ U ∧ k ∈ U =⇒ {|m|}rk ∈ U ;
5. {|m|}rk ∈ U ∧ k−1 ∈ U =⇒ m ∈ U ;
6. m ∈ U =⇒ comr(m), decr(m) ∈ U ;
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7. decr(m) ∈ U =⇒ m ∈ U ;
8. 〈m,m′〉 ∈ U =⇒ m,m′ ∈ U .
Next we need to find the right security notions to give sound computa-
tional interpretation to symbolic encryption and commitments.
5.3 Computational Setup
This section introduces syntaxis and security definitions for different crypto-
graphic primitives. Much of this is standard, we refer the reader to [GM84a,
RS92] and [NY90] for a thorough explanation. Some of this primitives will
be used to interpret algebraic operations and some of them are used as
building blocks for our construction of Section 5.5.
5.3.1 Commitment Schemes
Definition 5.3.1. A commitment scheme is a triple Ω = (TTP, Snd,Rcv)
of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. TTP, the trusted third party,
takes as input the security parameter 1η and produces a common reference
string σ. We require that |σ| ≥ p(η) for some non-constant polynomial
p. Snd, the sender, takes as input σ and a message m and produces a
commitment com to this message and a corresponding decommitment dec.
Rcv, the receiver, takes as input σ, com, and dec and produces a message
or ⊥.
MeaningfulnessΩ(A):
σ ← TTP(1η)
m← A(σ)
(com, dec)← Snd(σ,m)
m1 ← Rcv(σ, com, dec)
return m 6= m1
SecrecyTTP,Snd(A1, A2):
σ ← TTP(1η)
m0,m1, s← A1(σ)
b← {0, 1}
(com, dec)← Snd(σ,mb)
b′ ← A2(s, com)
return b = b′
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BindingTTP,Rcv(A):
σ ← TTP(1η)
(com, dec1, dec2)← A(σ)
m1 ← Rcv(σ, com, dec1)
m2 ← Rcv(σ, com, dec2)
return m1 6= ⊥ 6= m2
∧ m1 6= m2
The following three conditions must hold.
1. For all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A, the probability
P[MeaningfullnessΩ(A)] is a negligible function of η.
2. For all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (A1, A2), the advan-
tage
|P[SecrecyTTP,Snd(A1, A2)]− 1/2| is a negligible function of η.
3. For all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A, the probability
P[BindingTTP,Rcv(A)] is a negligible function of η.
Definition 5.3.2. A commitment scheme is said to be perfectly binding if
for all unbounded algorithms A, the probability P[BindingTTP,Rcv(A)] is
zero.
Definition 5.3.3. A commitment scheme is said to be perfectly hiding if
for all unbounded algorithms (A0, A1), |P[SecrecyTTP,Snd(A1, A2)] − 1/2|
is zero.
5.3.2 Encryption Schemes
Definition 5.3.4. An encryption scheme is a triple Π = (K, E ,D) of prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithms. K takes as input the security param-
eter 1η and produces a key pair (pk, sk) where pk is the public encryption
key and sk is the private decryption key. E takes as input a public key pk
and a plaintext m and outputs a ciphertext. D takes as input a private
key sk and a ciphertext and outputs a plaintext or ⊥. It is required that
P[(pk, sk)← K(1η); c← E(pk,m);m′ ← D(sk, c) : m = m′] = 1.
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IND-CCAΠ(A0, A1) :
(pk, sk)← K(1η)
m0,m1, s← AD0 (pk)
b← {0, 1}
c← E(pk,mb)
b′ ← AD1 (s, c)
return b = b′
Definition 5.3.5. An encryption scheme Π = (K, E ,D) is said to be IND-
CCA secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversariesA = (A0, A1)
the advantage of A, defined as |P[IND-CCAΠ(A0, A1)]−1/2|, is a negligi-
ble function of η. This adversary has access to a decryption oracle D that
on input c′ outputs D(sk, c′) with the only restriction that c 6= c′.
5.3.3 One-time Signatures
Definition 5.3.6. A signature scheme is a triple (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) of proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithms. Gen takes as input the security param-
eter 1η and produces a key pair (vk, sk) where vk is the signature verification
key and sk is the secret signing key. Sign takes as input sk and a message
m and produces a signature s of m. Vrfy takes as input vk, a message m
and a signature s and outputs whether or not s is a valid signature of m.
OTSΣ(A0, A1) :
(vk, sk)← Gen(1η)
m, s← A0(vk, 1η)
σ ← Sign(sk,m)
m′, σ′ ← A1(s, σ)
return σ 6= σ′ ∧ Vrfy(vk, (m′, σ′))
Definition 5.3.7. A signature scheme Σ = (Gen,Sign,Vrfy) is a strong,
one-time signature scheme if the success probability of any probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary (A0, A1) in the gameOTSΣ(A0, A1) is negligible
in the security parameter η.
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5.3.4 Tag-based Encryption
Definition 5.3.8. A tag-based encryption scheme (TBE) handling tags of
length ` (where ` is a polynomially-bounded function) is a triple of prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen,Enc,Dec). KeyGen takes a
security parameter 1η and returns a public key pk and secret key sk. The
public key pk includes the security parameter 1η and `(η); as well as the
description of sets M,R, C, which denote the set of messages, randomness
and ciphertexts respectively. These descriptions might depend on the pub-
lic key pk. Enc takes as inputs pk, a tag t ∈ {0, 1}` and m ∈M. It returns
a ciphertext c ∈ C. Dec takes as inputs the secret key sk, a tag t and c ∈ C,
and returns m ∈ M or ⊥ when c is not a legitimate ciphertext. For the
sake of consistency, these algorithms must satisfy Dec(sk, t, c) = m for all
t ∈ {0, 1}`, m ∈M, where c = Enc(pk, t,m).
Definition 5.3.9. Let E = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a TBE scheme. We
say E is IND-TBE-CCA secure if for any 3-tuple of PPT oracle algorithms
(A0, A1, A2) and any polynomially-bounded function ` the advantage in the
following game is negligible in the security parameter 1η:
A0(1η, `(η)) outputs a target tag t. KeyGen(1η) outputs (pk, sk) and
the adversary is given pk. Then the adversary A1 may ask polynomially-
many queries to a decryption oracle D(t′, c′) = Dec(sk, t′, c′) for pairs
tag-ciphertext (t′, c′) of its choice, with the restriction t 6= t′. At some
point, A1 outputs two equal length messages m0,m1. A bit b ← {0, 1}
is chosen at random and the adversary is given a challenge ciphertext
c← Enc(pk, t,mb). A2 may continue asking the decryption oracle for pairs
tag-ciphertext (t′, c′) of its choice, with the restriction t 6= t′. Finally, A2
outputs a guess b′.
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IND-TBE-CCA E(A0, A1, A2) :
t, s1 ← A0(1η, `(η))
(pk, sk)← KeyGen(1η)
m0,m1, s2 ← AD1 (s1, pk)
b← {0, 1}
c← Enc(pk, t,mb)
b′ ← AD2 (s2, c)
return b = b′
We define the advantage of A as |P[IND-TBE-CCA(A)]− 1/2|.
5.3.5 Interpretation
Suppose we have an encryption scheme Π, a commitment scheme Ω and a
function that maps symbolic constants to constant bitstrings. Then we can
define a mapping [[·]] from algebraic messages m ∈ Msg to distributions
over bitstrings [[m]] ∈ Str. This interpretation maps nonces to random
bitstrings of length η; encryptions are interpreted by running the encryption
algorithm E and for interpreting commitments and decommitments we use
the commit algorithm Snd.
In order to achieve sound interpretation we will explore the security
requirements on these cryptographic primitives. For the case of encryp-
tion it is satisfactory to use any IND-CCA encryption scheme as shown
in [MW04b]. For the case of commitments, using standard security defi-
nitions is not straightforward as they are not strong enough nor indistin-
guishability based. To achieve sound interpretation of the idealized Dolev-
Yao model, throughout the next section we elaborate on a convenient se-
curity definition for commitment schemes.
5.4 Definitions of Non-malleability
As noticed by Fischlin and Fischlin [FF00], there are two different versions
of non-malleability for commitment schemes, namely: NM with respect to
opening (NMO) and NM with respect to commitment (NMC). NMC was
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the version originally proposed by Dolev, Dwork and Naor in [DDN91]. It
means that given a commitment to a message m, the adversary is unable
to build a different commitment to m′, with m related to m′. This version
of non-malleability is appropriate while considering perfectly binding com-
mitments and only makes sense for schemes that are not perfectly hiding.
The other version NMO, seemingly weaker, means that an adversary
that is first given a commitment to m and on a second stage its decom-
mitment, is unable to find a different commitment-decommitment pair that
decommits to a message m′ related to m. This notion was studied by Di
Crescenzo, Ishai and Ostrovsky [CIO98] and later by Di Crescenzo, Katz,
Ostrovsky and Smith [CKOS01]. Intuitively a commitment scheme is non-
malleable if the adversary can do no better than a simulator which has
no information at all about the message that was committed to. Next we
recall their definition.
NMOΩ(A1, A2, D,R):
σ ← TTP(1η)
m1 ← D
com1, dec1 ← Snd(σ,m1)
com2 ← A1(σ, com1)
dec2 ← A2(σ, com1, com2, dec1)
m2 ← Rcv(σ, com2, dec2)
return com1 6= com2 ∧R(m1,m2)
SIM(S,D,R):
m1 ← D
m2 ← S(1η, D)
return R(m1,m2)
Definition 5.4.1 (Non-malleability [CIO98, CKOS01]). Let Ω = (TTP,
Snd,Rcv) be a commitment scheme. Ω is called non-malleable if for all
PPT adversaries (A1, A2) there is a PPT simulator S such that for all
distributions D and all relations R,
P[NMOΩ(A1, A2, D,R)]− P[SIM(S,D,R)]
is a negligible function of η.
Remark 5.4.1. To prevent that the adversary trivially wins, by refusing
to decommit, the following restriction over the relation R is imposed: for
all messages m, we have R(m,⊥) = 0.
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5.4.1 NMC-CCA: Non-malleability Against Chosen Com-
mitment Attacks
The previous definition deals with non-malleability with respect to open-
ing. For the relation between symbolic and computational cryptography we
need the stronger notion of non-malleability with respect to commitment.
Intuitively, this is because in the algebraic setting comr(m′) cannot be de-
duced from comr(m), with m′ somehow related to m. Therefore we adapt
the NMO definition to non-malleability with respect to commitment and we
strengthen it by incorporating active adaptive security, allowing the adver-
sary to mount chosen commitment attacks (CCA in short). Specifically, we
empower the adversary with access to a decommitment oracle D. To do so,
from now on, we restrict our attention to non-interactive, perfectly binding
trapdoor commitment schemes. The oracle D has access to the trapdoor
information. It takes as argument a commitment c with the restriction that
c is not equal to the challenge commitment com1. Then if the commitment
c has been correctly generated, the oracle returns a decommitment d which
opens c, and otherwise it outputs ⊥.
NMC-CCAΩ(A0, A1, R):
σ ← TTP(1η)
D, s1 ← AD0 (σ)
m1 ← D(σ)
com1, dec1 ← Snd(σ,m1)
com2, sr ← AD1 (s1, com1)
dec2 ← D(com2)
m2 ← Rcv(σ, com2, dec2)
return com1 6=
com2 ∧R(sr,m1,m2)
SIM-CCATTP(S0, S1, R):
σ ← TTP(1η)
D, s1 ← S0(σ)
m1 ← D(σ)
com2, sr ← S1(s1)
dec2 ← D(com2)
m2 ← Rcv(σ, com2, dec2)
return R(sr,m1,m2)
Definition 5.4.2 (NMC-CCA). Let Ω = (TTP, Snd,Rcv) be a commitment
scheme. Ω is called NMC-CCA secure if for all PPT adversaries (A0, A1)
there is a PPT simulator (S0, S1) such that for all relations R (with the
same restriction as in 5.4.1),
P[NMC-CCAΩ(A0, A1, R)]− P[SIM-CCATTP(S0, S1, R)]
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is a negligible function of η.
5.4.2 An Indistinguishability Based Definition
Next we introduce an equivalent formulation of NMC-CCA that is more
convenient to prove soundness of the Dolev-Yao model with respect to com-
mitment schemes.
IND-COM-CCAb(A0, A1):
σ ← TTP(1η)
m0,m1, s1 ← AD0 (σ)
com1, dec1 ← Snd(σ,mb)
b′ ← AD1 (s1, com1)
return b′
Definition 5.4.3 (IND-COM-CCA). Let Ω = (TTP,Snd,Rcv) be a com-
mitment scheme. Ω is said to be IND-COM-CCA secure if for all PPT
adversaries (A0, A1)
P[ IND-COM-CCA1(AD0 , AD1 ) = 1]−P[ IND-COM-CCA0(AD0 , AD1 ) = 1]
is a negligible function of η.
Next we show that NMC-CCA and IND-COM-CCA are equivalent. We
discuss it briefly as it is basically the proof that NM-CCA and IND-CCA
are equivalent, adapted to commitment schemes.
Theorem 5.4.4. Let Ω = (TTP, Snd,Rcv) be a commitment scheme. Then
Ω is IND-COM-CCA secure if and only if Ω is NMC-CCA secure.
Proof. (IND-COM-CCA ⇐ NMC-CCA) Let (B0, B1) be an adversary for
IND-COM-CCA. Then we build the following adversary (A0, A1) against
NMC-CCA.
Algorithm AD0 (σ) :
m0,m1, s1 ← BD0 (σ)
D ← U({m0,m1})
return D, (σ,m0,m1, s1)
Algorithm AD1 ((σ,m0,m1, s1), c1) :
b← BD1 (s1, c1)
c2 ← Snd(σ,mb)
return c2, ²
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where U is the uniform distribution. Now take the relation R(sr,m1,m2)
as m1 equal to m2. It should be clear, after unfolding (A0, A1) in the
NMC-CCA game, that this adversary has the same advantage that (B0, B1)
has against IND-COM-CCA.
(IND-COM-CCA ⇒ NMC-CCA) Let (A0, A1) be an adversary for NMC-
CCA. Then we build the following adversary (B0, B1) against IND-COM-
CCA.
Algorithm BD0 (σ) :
D, s1 ← AD0 (σ)
m0,m1 ← D
return m0,m1, (σ,m0,m1, s1)
Algorithm BD1 ((σ,m0,m1, s1), c1) :
c2 ← AD1 (s1, c1)
m← D(c2)
if m = m1 then return 1
else return 0
Again, just by unfolding these adversaries in the IND-COM-CCA game,
it is easy to verify that they have the same advantage that (A0, A1) has
against NMC-CCA.
It remains to show that such a security notion for a commitment scheme
is achievable. In the next section we give a practical construction that
achieves IND-COM-CCA security.
5.5 The Construction
We now propose a new construction for IND-COM-CCA that is computa-
tionally hiding, perfectly binding, reusable, non-interactive, non-malleable
under adaptive adversaries, and provably secure under the assumption that
trapdoor permutations exist.
Next we outline the idea of our construction. As pointed out by Di
Crescenzo, Katz, Ostrovsky and Smith [CKOS01], an IND-CCA secure
public key encryption scheme can be converted into a perfectly binding
non-malleable commitment scheme. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an
indistinguishable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks secure public
key encryption scheme. The idea is to commit to a message m by encrypt-
ing it using random coins r; commitment is set to be the ciphertext c =
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Enc(pk,m; r); de-commitment is set to be the pair (m, r); finally the open-
ing algorithm takes (c,m, r) and checks whether c = Enc(pk,m; r). When
trying to directly use this construction to instantiate an IND-COM-CCA
commitment scheme one might not be able to simulate the de-commitment
oracle. The reason is that given a ciphertext/commitment c, one recovers
the purported embedded messagem by using the decryption algorithm, but
not necessarily the randomness r. One way to break through this situation
is to include in the commitment a second ciphertext c′ = Enc(pk′, r; r′)
encrypting the randomness r used in the first ciphertext c = Enc(pk,m; r).
This is the key idea of our construction. We additionally use one-time sig-
natures and this together with tag-based encryption schemes ensure the
de-commitment oracle does not leak vital information.
Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a tag based encryption scheme and let
Σ = (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) be a signature scheme. Define (TTP, Snd,Rcv) as
follows:
– TTP runs KeyGen(1η) twice to obtain (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2). The
common reference string includes pk1, pk2.
– To commit to a message m, the sender Snd computes and outputs the
commitment C = (vk, c1, c2, s) where c1 = Enc(pk1, vk,m; r1), c2 =
Enc(pk2, vk, r1; r2), with r1, r2 ← R, (vk, sk) ← Gen(1η) and s ←
Sign(sk, (c1, c2)). The decommitment is set to be (m, r1).
– To de-commit ciphertext C = (vk, c1, c2, s) using (m, r1), the receiver
Rcv first checks if the signature on (c1, c2) is correct, and afterwards
whether or not c1 = Enc(pk1, vk,m; r1).
We assume R =M.
Theorem 5.5.1. Assume that (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is an IND-TBE-CCA
secure tag based encryption scheme and that (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) is a one-time
strongly unforgeable signature scheme. Then (TTP, Snd,Rcv) is an IND-
COM-CCA secure commitment scheme.
Proof. We transform an adversary A against the IND-COM-CCA security
of the commitment scheme into adversaries against the TBE and the OTS.
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Next we will describe a sequence of games following the methodology ad-
vocated in [Sho04, BR06]. Let Xi be the event that A learns the challenge
bit b in the i-th game.
Game 0. This is the unmodified IND-COM-CCA game. Trivially,
|P[X0]− 1/2| equals the advantage of A against IND-COM-CCA.
Game 1. In this game we disallow decryption queries C = (vk, c1, c2, s)
s.t. vk = vk? where (vk?, c?1, c
?
2, s
?) is the challenge commitment. Then,
we get that |P[X1] − P[X0]| is less or equal than the advantage any PPT
algorithm has in breaking the one-time strong unforgeability security of the
OTS.
Game 2. Still decryption queries with vk = vk? are forbidden. In
this game we use the IND-CCA security of the second instance of the TBE
scheme. The components c?1 and c
?
2 of the challenge ciphertext are changed
to c?1 = Enc(pk
?
1, vk
?,m?b ; r1), and c
?
2 = Enc(pk
?
2, vk
?, r′) where r′, r1 ← R.
Now, we have |P[X2]− P[X1]| is less or equal than the advantage any PPT
algorithm has in breaking the selective IND-CCA security of the TBE.
Finally it is shown that |P[X2]− 1/2]| is bounded by the advantage any
PPT algorithm has in breaking the selective IND-CCA security of the first
instance of the TBE.
Putting everything together, we get that |P[X0] − 1/2| is bounded by
the advantages in breaking the OTS scheme plus twice the advantage in
breaking the selective IND-CCA of the TBE scheme. Next we describe the
concrete adversaries,
Game 0 ≈ Game 1. Assume that there is an adversary (A0, A1)
that is able to distinguish the environments of Game 0 and 1. Then we
build an adversary (B0, B1) against the one-time strong unforgeability of
the signature scheme.
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Algorithm B0(1η, vk):
pk1, sk1 ← KeyGen(1η)
pk2, sk2 ← KeyGen(1η)
m0,m1, s1 ← AD0 (pk1, pk2)
b← {0, 1}
r1 ←R
c1 ← Enc(pk1, vk,mb; r1)
c2 ← Enc(pk2, vk, r1)
return (c1, c2), (s1||vk||c1||c2||sk1||sk2)
and B1((s1||vk||c1||c2||sk1||sk2), s) = [b′ ← AD1 (s1, (vk, c1, c2, s))]. Calls to
the decommitment oracle D(vk′, c′1, c′2, s′) are simulated by firstly verify-
ing the signature Vrfy(vk′, (c′1, c′2), s′). If the verification succeeds then the
oracle returns the pair (Dec(sk1, vk′, c′1),Dec(sk2, vk
′, c′2)) and otherwise it
outputs ⊥. If the adversary eventually performs a query D(vk′, c′1, c′2, s′)
with vk′ = vk then the execution of the adversary is aborted and B out-
puts ((c′1, c′2), s′), thus breaking the one-time strong unforgeability of the
signature scheme.
Game 1 ≈ Game 2. Assume that there is an adversary (A0, A1)
that is able to distinguish the environments of Game 1 and 2. Then we
build an adversary (B0, B1, B2) against the IND-CCA security of the second
TBE. Take B0(1η, `(η)) = [(vk, sk) ← Gen(1η); return vk, (vk||sk)] and
B1(s1, pk2) = [r′, r1 ←R; return r′, r1, (s1||r′||r1||pk2)] and
Algorithm B
Osk2
2 ((vk||sk||r′||r1||pk2), c2) :
pk1, sk1 ← KeyGen(1η)
m0,m1, s1 ← AD0 (pk1, pk2)
b← {0, 1}
c1 ← Enc(pk1, vk,mb; r1)
s← Sign(sk, (c1, c2))
b′ ← AD1 (s1, (vk, c1, c2, s))
if b = b′ then return 1
else return 0
Calls to the decommitment oracle D(vk, c1, c2, s) are simulated by firstly
verifying the signature Vrfy(vk, (c1, c2), s). If the verification succeeds then
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the oracle returns (Dec(sk1, vk, c1),Osk2(c2)) and otherwise it outputs ⊥.
Finally we show that |P[X2] − 1/2]| is bounded by the advantage any
PPT algorithm has in breaking the selective IND-CCA security of the
first instance of the TBE. Assume that there is an adversary (A0, A1)
for Game 2. Then we build an adversary (B0, B1, B2) against the IND-
CCA security of the first TBE scheme. Take B0(1η, `(η)) = [(vk, sk) ←
Gen(1η); return vk, (vk||sk)] and
Algorithm B
Osk1
1 ((vk||sk), pk1) :
pk2, sk2 ← KeyGen(1η)
m0,m1, s1 ← AD0 (pk1, pk2)
return (m0,m1), (vk||sk||pk1||s1||pk2||sk2)
Algorithm B
Osk1
2 ((vk||sk||pk1||s1||pk2||sk2), c1) :
r′ ←R
c2 ← Enc(pk2, vk, r′)
s← Sign(sk, (c1, c2))
b′ ← AD1 (s1, (vk, c1, c2, s))
return b′
Calls to the decommitment oracle D(vk, c1, c2, s) are simulated by firstly
verifying the signature Vrfy(vk, (c1, c2), s). If the verification succeeds then
the oracle returns (Osk1(c1),Dec(sk2, vk, c2)) and otherwise it outputs ⊥.
5.6 Protocol Execution and State Traces
We now prove that it is possible to port proofs in the symbolic framework
to the computational one. First, for the sake of self-containment we de-
scribe the adversarial model and the execution environment following the
directions of Micciancio and Warinschi [MW04b]. We refer the reader to
this paper for a thorough explanation.
The message space and the closure operator were defined in Section 5.2.
Messages are used to formally describe cryptographic protocols. The clo-
sure represents the knowledge that can be extracted from a message, and
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is used to define what valid algebraic protocol runs are. Intuitively a pro-
tocol run is valid if every message sent by a principal can be deduced from
its knowledge except maybe for some fresh randomness. In this setting an
adversary is in control of the communication media and is able to interact
with honest participants. Consider then an adversary that has access to
an oracle that will play the role of the honest participants. This adversary
can start new sessions of the protocol and send messages to a principal of a
given session and get the respective answer back. Formally, the adversary
A can perform one of the following queries to the execution oracle O.
1. newsession([I1 . . . In]) that takes a list of user identities Ii and returns
a new session identifier s.
2. send(s, I,m) that delivers the message m to the principal I of session
s. Then O updates I’s state and returns the answer to the adversary.
In case that the adversary performs a query that is not according to the
protocol, for the specific state of the receiver, the oracle aborts the execution
of this session.
In a formal protocol, the messages exchanged are algebraic expressions
from the message algebra. A formal adversary Af will interact with the
formal oracle Of in a symbolic protocol run.
On the other hand, a computational adversary Ac is a probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machine that operates on bitstrings. For a fixed
value of the security parameter there is a set of primitive bitstrings for con-
stants and nonces denoted by Primη. The set of bitstrings Msgη is build
from Primη by tupling, encryptions, commitments and decommitments.
There is a set Sid of session identifiers; a set Uid of user identities and a
set Vars of variables in the abstract protocol description.
Let F : Sid × Uid → (Vars → Msg,N) be the state maintained by
the formal oracle Of . On input (s, I) it returns the state of principal I
in session s together with his instruction pointer. The instruction pointer
indicates on which step of the abstract protocol this principal is. Similarly,
C : Sid×Uid→ (Vars→Msgη,N) is the state maintained by the compu-
tational oracle Oc. Assume without loss of generality that all the sessions
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are created at the beginning. Then, a formal adversary Af is just a sequence
of send(s, I,m) queries. We say that a formal adversary Af is a valid Dolev-
Yao adversary (Af ∈ DY) if each message he sends to the oracle is in the
closure of his initial knowledge plus the answers he gets from the oracle
Of . A protocol execution, thus, is the sequence of states F0, F1, . . . of the
formal oracle Of and is denoted by trace(Af ,Of ). After fixing the random-
ness of the adversary and that of the oracle environment to τA and τO, we
can similarly define a computational execution trace trace(Ac(τA),Oc(τO))
as the sequence of states C0, C1, . . . of the computational oracle Oc.
Definition 5.6.1. We say that [[·]] : Prim → Primη is an interpretation
function if it is injective and structure preserving (i.e., maps formal nonces
to nonce bitstrings, formal commitments to commitments and so on).
Definition 5.6.2. Let F = F0, F1, . . . be a formal execution trace and let
C = C0, C1, . . . be a concrete execution trace. We say that F ¹ C if there
exists an interpretation function [[·]] such that [[F0]] = C0, [[F1]] = C1, . . . .
The following theorem shows that a computational adversary has no
more power than an algebraic adversary.
Theorem 5.6.3. Let (TTP, Snd,Rcv) be an IND-COM-CCA secure com-
mitment scheme and let (K, E ,D) be an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme.
For any computational adversary Ac, the probability
P[ ∃Af ∈ DY : trace(Af ,Of ) ¹ trace(Ac(τA),Oc(τO))]
is overwhelming. Here the probability is taken over the random choices τA
of the adversary and τO of the oracle.
Proof. First fix the randomness τA and τO. Running the computational ad-
versary Ac, it produces a sequence of queries/answers to/from the computa-
tional oracle. Because we know all the trapdoor information that the oracle
generates and because the adversary has to send properly typed messages,
we can de-construct any message sent into primitive terms. Choosing new
algebraic terms for each distinct primitive bitstring encountered we build a
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sequence of algebraic queries which constitutes an algebraic adversary Af .
Note that for different random choices of τA and τO we get the same Af
(up to renaming) with overwhelming probability.
It remains to show that the adversary we just built is Dolev-Yao. Sup-
pose that it is not. Then Af must, at some point, send a query that contains
a non-adversarial nonce n? that is not in the closure of the messages he re-
ceived before. If this nonce occurs inside an encryption (with an unknown
key) then one can build an adversary breaking the IND-CCA security of the
encryption scheme [MW04b]. Assume then that it occurs inside a commit-
ment. We now build an adversary that breaks the IND-COM-CCA security
of the commitment scheme.
This adversary simulates the environment to Ac using the de-commit
oracle when necessary except for the query that contains n?. There it
generates two interpretations (n0, n1) for n? and gives them as challenge
plaintext for the IND-COM-CCA game. The challenger gives back a com-
mitment to nb where b is the challenge bit. This commitment to nb is used
to answer the oracle queries. At the moment AC outputs the interpretation
of n? we can check whether it is n0 or n1.
A formal security notion is a predicate Pf on formal traces. A protocol
Π |=f Pf if for all adversaries Af ∈ DY holds that trace(Af ,Of ) ∈ Pf . Sim-
ilarly, a computational security notion is a predicate Pc on computational
traces. A protocol Π |=c Pc if for all probabilistic polynomial-time ad-
versaries Ac holds that trace(Af ,Of ) ∈ Pc with overwhelming probability
(taken over the random choices of the adversary and the ones of the oracle
environment). The proof of the following theorem follows as in [MW04b].
Theorem 5.6.4. Let (TTP, Snd,Rcv) be a IND-COM-CCA secure commit-
ment scheme and let (K, E ,D) be an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme.
Let Pf and Pc be respectively formal and computational security notions
such that for all formal traces ft and all computational traces ct it holds
that (ft ∈ Pf ∧ ft ¹ ct) =⇒ ct ∈ Pc. Then
Π |=f Pf =⇒ Π |=c Pc .
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5.7 Conclusions
We presented two equivalent security notions for commitment schemes: a
simulation based definition and a indistinguishability based one. We then
gave a concrete scheme satisfying this security notion. This construction
is of interest on itself as it is generic and has some interesting features
like being reusable, perfectly binding and secure against adaptive chosen-
commitment attacks. We then applied this new machinery to give sound in-
terpretation of symbolic commitments while considering active adversaries.
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Samenvatting
In onze moderne samenleving worden we omringd door gedistribueerde
systemen. De meeste elektronische apparaten die tegenwoordig verkrijgbaar
zijn, kunnen in een netwerk functioneren of met elkaar communiceren. Nu
is communicatie over een gezamenlijk medium inherent onveilig. Daarom is
het goed ontwerpen van veiligheidsprotocollen een prioriteit. Het ontwerpen
en analyseren van veiligheidsprotocollen is een uitdagende taak. Diverse
protocollen die in de literatuur voorgesteld zijn, bleken later toch gebreken
te vertonen. Dit komt door de intrinsieke complexiteit die een kwaadaardige
aanvaller met zich meebrengt.
Het traditionele complexiteitstheoretische aanvallersmodel is realistisch,
maar ingewikkeld. Hierdoor is het ontwerpen en analyseren van protocollen
in dit model gevoelig voor fouten.
Het Dolev-Yao model is een aanvallersmodel waarin de aanvaller de
volledige controle heeft over het communicatiemedium. In dit model zijn
er geen restricties op de looptijd van de aanvaller, maar is een aanvaller
helemaal niet in staat enig cryptografische primitief te breken. Bewijzen
in dit model zijn eenvoudiger dan in het complexiteitstheoretische model,
maar ondervangen nog steeds de meeste gemaakte fouten in het ontwerpen
van veiligheidsprotocollen.
Dit proefschrift bestudeert het probleem van het ontwerpen van vei-
ligheidsprotocollen zowel vanuit het computationele als vanuit het formele
gezichtspunt en beschrijft de relatie hiertussen. We bekijken vier originele
bijdragen.
• We beschrijven een gedecentraliseerde digitale munteenheid voor peer-
to-peer en grid toepassingen dat dubbele uitgaven en andere vormen
van fraude kan detecteren.
• We ontwikkelen een formeel raamwerk voor de analyse van anoni-
mizerende protocollen in termen van epistemische logica. We illus-
treren deze aanpak door zender-anonimiteit en niet-koppelbaarheid
voor enkele welbekende protocollen te analyseren.
• We relateren het Dolev-Yao model, uitgebreid met hash functies, met
een realistisch computationeel model. We gebruiken een specifieke
gerandomizeerde constructie om hashes te interpreteren. We laten
zien dat dit model gezond en volledig is als de aanvaller passief is.
We laten zien dat het niet gezond is als de aanvaller actief is.
• We breiden het onderzoek naar deze relatie uit met commitment
schema’s en actieve aanvallers. We stellen een nieuw, sterker vei-
ligheidsbegrip voor en geven een nieuwe constructie die die veilig be-
wezen kan worden onder deze definitie. We lichten de bruikbaarheid
van deze constructie toe door er een gezond interpretatie van te geven
in het standaard model.
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